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I. INTRODUCTION
Montana has an active system of justice and city courts,
which serve thousands of citizens every year. In recent years, the
jurisdiction of these courts has expanded steadily, and, as a
result, their civil caseload is increasing exponentially. These
"people's courts" are courts of first and last resort for many Mon-
tanans and may be the only courts to which many citizens are
ever exposed.
A large percentage of the parties in justice and city courts
represent themselves without the advice of practicing lawyers.
Furthermore, most of the judges in these courts are non-lawyers
whose only legal education occurs in semi-annual conferences
after they are elected to the bench. Because the justice and city
courts administer so much justice with so little formal legal
education among their judges and litigants, clear procedural
rules are essential to guide the judges, the parties, and the
courts' staffs and to make the system work as efficiently and
fairly as possible.
The justice courts have been an important part of Montana's
[Vol. 58
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judicial system since statehood. Until recently, the procedural
guidelines for these courts were nearly as old as the courts them-
selves. The 1895 Code established statutory provisions to govern
proceedings in justice courts which were largely unchanged for
almost one hundred years. In 1982, the Montana Supreme Court
adopted the first set of uniform rules for practice and procedure
in justice court.1 In 1990, the Montana Justice and City Court
Rules of Civil Procedure (the Rules) superseded the twenty origi-
nal rules. 2 The drafters made some significant changes in light
of the courts' experience with the first set of rules and added
provisions to deal with practice in city courts.
The past seven years have revealed several problems with
the current Rules. Last year, the Montana Supreme Court's
Commission on Courts of Limited Jurisdiction (the Commission)
appointed a subcommittee to identify problems with the current
Rules and to draft solutions to make the rules easier and more
effective to use.3 The committee recommended, and the Commis-
sion approved, a set of proposed amendments to the current
Rules. The amendments are currently before the Montana Su-
preme Court for consideration, and the court will be asking for
public comment in the spring of 1997. The purposes of this arti-
cle are to facilitate informed comment from the bench, the bar,
and the people of Montana and to help practitioners and liti-
gants interpret and use the proposed Rules in the likely event
that the amendments are adopted.
Part II of this Article looks at the history of the courts of
limited jurisdiction in Montana. It then examines the current
role of these courts in Montana's civil justice system. The Article
next discusses the current Rules and describes some of the prob-
lems these rules raise. Finally, the Article outlines the changes
suggested by the proposed Rules, and suggests some legislative
changes that would help to streamline and clarify current prac-
tice in these important, but often overlooked, courts.
1. Order Adopting the Montana Justice and City Courts Rules of Civil Proce-
dure (Mont. filed July 15, 1982) (effective date Oct. 1, 1982).
2. MONT. J. & CITY CT. R. CIV. P. 1-24, appearing in MONT. CODE ANN. Title
25, Chapter 23 (enacted 1991) (hereinafter "current Rules").
3. I was one of three members of this subcommittee. The others were Nancy
Sabo, Justice of the Peace, Ravalli County, Montana, and David Hull, attorney, Hele-
na, Montana.
1997]
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Use of the Courts of Limited Jurisdiction
The bulk of civil litigation in Montana is conducted in the
justice and city courts. This state has 159 justice, city, and mu-
nicipal courts, collectively called the Courts of Limited Jurisdic-
tion, that employ 114 judges.4 The justice and city courts civil
jurisdiction is limited by the amount at issue, but that jurisdic-
tional limit has climbed steadily in recent years and now stands
at $5,000 in civil cases.5 By contrast, Montana has fifty-six gen-
eral jurisdiction district courts that are divided into twenty-one
judicial districts and served by thirty-seven judges.6
The courts' increased authority, their reputation as more
"user-friendly" than the district courts, and the sheer number of
limited jurisdiction courts allow Montanans to conduct a very
large share of their civil litigation at the justice and city court
level. In fact, in recent years, more plaintiffs have filed civil
cases in the courts of limited jurisdiction than in the district
courts.7 The civil filings in this state's courts of limited jurisdic-
4. See 1995 MONT. SUP. CT. JUDICIAL REP. 38. Montana has 71 Justice of the
Peace Courts, 83 City Courts, and one Municipal Court. See id. The difference in the
two tallies is not explained. In January 1997, Billings and Kalispell both established
Municipal Courts, and Great Falls is currently considering following their lead.
Because some courts require only part-time judges, some judges are available
to work in more than one court, i.e., serving part-time as a city judge and part-time
as a justice of the peace: "Montana has a total of 166 Limited Jurisdiction Courts.
There are 120 Limited Court Judges. Forty-six Justices of the Peace also serve as
City Court Judges." 1994 MONT. SUP. CT. JUDICIAL REP. 2.
5. The original Montana Constitution restricted the civil jurisdiction of the
justice courts to cases where the debt, damage, claim, or value of the property in-
volved was $300 or less. See MONT. CONST. OF 1889, art. VIII. The 1972 Constitution
also establishes justice courts, but leaves the subject matter jurisdiction of those
courts to the legislature. See MONT. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (stating "justice courts shall
have such original jurisdiction as may be provided by law").
The legislature lost no time exercising its new authority to increase the civil
jurisdiction of the justice and city courts. In 1975, the limit went from the historic
$300 to $1,500. See 1975 Mont. Laws 11-420. In 1981, the monetary limit rose from
$1,500 to $3,500. See 1981 Mont. Laws 1-348. The most recent amendment to section
3-10-301 of the Montana Code Annotated set the limit for civil actions in justice
courts at $5,000, exclusive of court costs. See 1991 Mont. Laws 1-307.
Unlike the constitutionally-created justice courts, the city courts were estab-
lished by the legislature in 1895. The Montana Code provides that the city courts
have concurrent jurisdiction with the justice courts. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-11-102
(1995). Thus, the same $5,000 jurisdictional limit applies in city courts. See MONT.
CODE ANN. § 3-10-301 (1995).
6. See 1994 MONT. SUP. CT. JUDICIAL REP. 5.
7. In 1992, there were 9,696 civil filings in justice and city courts compared
with the 11,696 civil filings in the state's district courts. See 1992 MONT. SuP. CT.
4
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JuDICIAL REP. 15-37 (comprising 45% of all civil cases filed in Montana). In 1993,
15,436 civil cases were filed in justice and city courts in Montana, an increase of
59% over the previous year. See 1993 MONT. Sup. CT. JUDICIAL REP. 11-37. In com-
parison, 11,410 civil cases were filed in district courts, a decrease of two percent. See
id. Thus, in 1993, the justice and city courts received 58% of the new civil caseload
in the Montana state court system.
In 1994, 29,444 new civil cases were filed in the courts of limited jurisdiction,
an astonishing 91% increase from 1993. See Facsimile from Kelly Chapman, Office of
the Supreme Court Administrator, to Cynthia Ford (Sept. 5, 1996) (on file with au-
thor). The district court civil filings in 1994, statewide, came to 12,611 (exclusive of
the additional total of 12,858 domestic relations, adoption, sanity, juvenile, and pro-
bate cases not included in the "civil" classification). See id. This constituted an in-
crease of 10.5% over the 1993 District Court civil filing figure. The courts of limited
jurisdiction carried 70% of the total new civil filings in state courts in 1994.
In 1995, there were 35,094 civil filings in the limited jurisdiction courts (exclu-
sive of the four city courts and one justice court whose figures were not submitted
on time to the Supreme Court Administrator), a 19% increase from the previous
year. See id. In the district courts, there were 13,534 new cases classified as "civil"
(and an additional 14,312 cases classified as domestic relations, adoption, mentally
ill, juvenile, or probate). See id. Thus, limited jurisdiction courts civil filings com-
prised 72% of the overall civil caseload. The following Tables A and B represent,
respectively, the growth in the civil caseload in Montana's courts of limited jurisdic-
tion and a comparison of the caseloads of Montana's courts of limited jurisdiction,
district courts, and the United States District Court for the District of Montana:
Increase in Number of Filings
For Justice and City Courts
40000
35000
30000
25000
20000-
15000-
10000
5000
1992 1993 1994 1995
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tion also far surpass the number of civil filings in the United
States District Court for the District of Montana. 8 Further, de-
spite the ready availability of an appeal from a civil judgment in
justice or city court,9 only 1.6 percent of justice and city court
Number of Civil Cases
in Justice, State and Federal Courts
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LI Justice & City Courts
State District Courts
Federal District Courts
8. The federal court statistics are for the 12-month periods ending September
30 of each year. From October 1, 1991 through September 30, 1992 a total of 706
civil cases were filed in the U.S. District Courts for the District of Montana, 484
involving private parties and 225 involving the United States as a party. L. RALPH
MECHAM, JUDICIAL BUSINEss OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, REPORT OF THE DIREC-
TOR, Table C-1 (1992). For 1993, the total number of civil cases filed was 749; 535
cases were private and 215 cases were U.S. civil cases. L. RALPH MECHAM, JUDICIAL
BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR, Table C-1
(1993). In 1994, the total number of civil cases filed was 701, consisting of 485 pri-
vate and 216 U.S. civil cases. L. RALPH MECHAM, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED
STATES COI]RPTS, REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR, Table C-1 (1994). For 1995, the total
number of civil cases filed was 683; 456 cases were private and 227 cases were U.S.
civil cases. L. RALPH MECHAM, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS,
REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR, Table C-1 (1995).
Adding these numbers to those for the Montana state court system shows that
in 1992, the state courts of limited jurisdiction received 44% of all the civil cases
filed in Montana's state and federal courts combined. In 1993, state courts of limited
jurisdiction received 56% of all the civil cases filed; in 1994, that number rose to
69%; and in 1995, that number rose yet again to 71%.
9. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-33-301 (1995) (explaining that a civil judgment
from city or justice court may be appealed de novo to district court); see also City of
Billings v. McCarvel, 262 Mont. 96, 100, 863 P.2d 441, 444 (1993) (citing Missoula
6
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cases do in fact end in appeal, probably due to the minimal
amounts at issue.' ° Thus, for many Montanans, justice or city
court is thought to be the court of first and final resort.
B. Lawyer Involvement in the Courts of Limited Jurisdiction
The very courts that dispense so much of Montana's civil
justice are those in which lawyers are the least involved. In
Montana, most city and justice court judges, like supreme court
and district judges, are elected." Judges in the justice and city
courts are not required to have any legal training or experience
prior to assuming office. The only requirement for election or ap-
pointment is that the candidate be a United States citizen and a
resident of that county for at least one year. 2 Of the 113 justice
Elec. & Light Co. v. Morgan, 13 Mont. 394, 34 P. 488 (1893)). Further, district
courts are courts of record, while city and justice courts are not. See MONT. CODE
ANN. § 3-1-102 (1995).
10. The Supreme Court Administrator's Office calculates that in 1993, 302 civil
cases were appealed from justice or city court to district court, comprising less than
2% of the total number of civil filings in the lower courts that year. (There are no
figures for earlier years.) This means that only 2.6% of the civil cases filed in Mon-
tana District Courts in 1993 were considered by a court of limited jurisdiction. In
1994 and 1995, the numbers were similar: in 1994, 469 civil cases were appealed
from limited jurisdiction to district courts compared to 29,444 new cases filed in
limited jurisdiction courts, which constitutes only 1.6% of the new caseload in the
limited jurisdiction courts and only 3.7% of the new civil cases filed in the district
courts. In 1995, 419 civil cases were appealed to district courts from justice and city
courts, which was 1.2% of the number of new cases filed in limited jurisdiction
courts that year and 3.0% of the new civil actions fied in district courts statewide.
Interestingly, the trend appears to be that the percentage of cases appealed to dis-
trict court is decreasing as the number of cases filed in the lower courts increases.
Taken together, the 1993, 1994, and 1995 appeals numbers reveal that an average of
1.6% of the cases filed in the limited jurisdiction courts are appealed to the district
courts.
11. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-10-201 (1995) (providing for the election of justic-
es of the peace). In first class cities (population of 10,000 or more) and second class
cities (population between 5,000 and 10,000), the city judge must be elected. See
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 7-4-4101(2), -4102(2) (1995). In third class cities (population
between 1,000 and 5,000) and in towns (population between 300 and 1,000), the
governing body determines whether the city judge is to be appointed or elected. See
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 7-4-4102(3), -4103(3) (1995). However, when an elected judge
dies, retires, or otherwise vacates the office during his or her term, the county com-
missioners or city officials appoint a successor to complete the term. See MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 3-10-206, 7-4-4112(1) (1995).
12. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-10-204 (1995). The qualifications for city judges
are similar, although the city may prescribe additional qualifications by ordinance.
See MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-11-202(1) (1995). Billings has required its City Court judge
to have a Juris Doctor. Justice of the peace and city court judges are required to
attend an orientation course immediately after being elected, as well as biannual
training sessions. "Failure to attend disqualifies him from office and creates a vacan-
7
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and city court judges in Montana in 1995, only nine had grad-
uated from law school.13 Moreover, many of the litigants who
prosecute and defend civil cases in the limited jurisdiction courts
appear pro se, conducting their cases without the benefit of legal
representation."' Thus, in many cases, neither the parties nor
the court has benefitted from systematic study of civil proce-
dure.15
The current Rules intend to provide clear rules for civil pro-
ceedings in these courts. When drafting the first version of these
rules, the rulemakers designed a simplified system to fit the
limited legal experience of both bench and litigants as well as
the limited monetary value of the cases brought in justice and
city courts. As a result, civil procedure in the courts of limited
jurisdiction differs markedly from the procedure in district court.
Some of the differences represent a conscious intent to tailor city
and justice court procedure to the specific caseloads and clientele
in those courts. However, some differences in the Rules are un-
necessary and may, in fact, impair their overall goal.
C. A Brief History of Montana's Courts of Limited Jurisdiction
Since the beginning of the legal history of Montana, justices
of the peace have played an important part in the judiciary.
When Congress created the Territory of Montana in 1864, it
vested the judicial power of the territory in a supreme court,
district courts, probate courts, and justices of the peace. 6
cy in the office." MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-10-203(3) (1995).
The legislation authorizing establishment of a municipal court requires that
the municipal court judge be admitted to the practice of law in Montana for at least
two years prior to the date of appointment or election. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-6-
202(1) (1995). This requirement, combined with the fact that the municipal court is a
court of record, makes the municipal court more like a district court, despite its
jurisdictional limits. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-6-101(1) (1995).
13. This comprised eight percent of the limited jurisdiction judges. One of these
judges, Whitefish City Judge Brad Johnson, has a J.D. and an LL.M. Interview with
Kelly Chapman, Office of the Montana Supreme Court Administrator, Nov. 7, 1996.
14. Neither state district courts nor the state justice or city courts keep any
records on the numbers of civil litigants who represent themselves. A local survey of
200 cases filed in the various courts located in Missoula county in the twelve month
period from September 1, 1993 through August 31, 1994 showed that approximately
96% of civil cases in the Justice or City Courts had a pro se litigant on one side or
the other at the time of trial, compared with approximately 26% in United States
District Court (Missoula Division) and approximately 33% in the Montana Fourth
Judicial District Courts.
15. Cf WILLIAM B. PowERis, A STUDY OF CONTEMPORARY LAW SCHOOL CURRICU-
LA, at 12.
16. Act of May 26, 1864, Ch. 95, § 9, 13 Stat. 85, 88-89 (1864).
204 [Vol. 58
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Montana's first constitution, adopted in 1889, also specifically
provides for justice of the peace courts and requires two justices
of the peace in each township. 7 Eighty-three years later, the
delegates to the 1972 Montana Constitutional Convention recon-
sidered the need for and roles of justices of the peace in the
state. 8 Both the majority and the minority proposals of the
Convention's Judiciary Committee chose to retain justice courts,
but the majority proposal provided that the new constitution
should specifically refer to the courts. 9 The Convention ulti-
mately adopted the majority view, resulting in Article VII, Sec-
tion 5 of the Montana Constitution:
(1) There shall be elected in each county at least one justice of
the peace with qualifications, training, and monthly compensa-
tion provided by law ....
(2) Justice courts shall have such original jurisdiction as may
be provided by law ....
(3) The legislature may provide for additional justices of the
peace in each county.2"
In addition to the constitutionally established justice courts,
17. See MONT. CONST. OF 1889, art. VIII, §§ 1, 20.
18. In 1961, the Montana Legislative Council met after conducting a general
study of the justice court system in the state. See MONTANA LEGIsLATWVE REPORT,
supra note 17, at 1. The Legislative Council's Report concluded that the salary and
qualifications of justices were too low, court facilities were inadequate, that there
were too many justices of the peace, and that "jurisdiction is too limited both as to
territory and amount of money in controversy." See id. at 4. The Council reported
that many of these problems could not be improved without amendment to the state
constitution and recommended that the amendment delete all references to justice
courts from the constitution so that the legislature could make changes to the system
freely. See id. The 1972 Constitutional Convention disregarded this advice.
19. Montana Constitutional Convention, 1971-72, Judiciary Committee Proposal,
Vol. I, 500-01. The majority proposal provided for at least one justice of the peace in
each county with "such original jurisdiction as may be prescribed by law." See, also,
id. at Vol. IV, 1010 (considering the majority and minority proposals).
The minority proposal did not explicitly require justice of the peace courts,
instead stating that "the judicial power of the state is vested in a supreme court and
district courts and such other courts as may be provided by law." Judiciary Minority
Proposal, Proceedings of the Montana Constitutional Convention, Vol. I, § 1, 510. The
minority's comments on its proposal specify that "by deleting reference to justice of
the peace, there is no intention to abolish or affect the present jurisdiction and oper-
ation of these courts, but rather to leave assignment of judicial power in these courts
exclusively to the legislature where there is wide latitude for improvement and alter-
ations that will adjust to the varying complexities of rural and urban problems in
the administration of justice on the lower level." Id. at 514.
20. MONT. CONST. art. VII, § 5 (decreasing the required number of justices of
the peace from four to one per county, but allowing the legislature to increase this
number if necessary). Currently, Montana has 71 justice of the peace courts in 56
counties. See 1995 MONT. SUP. CT. JUDICIAL REP. 4.
9
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Montana's 1889 and 1972 constitutions both authorized the legis-
lature to establish police and municipal courts for cities and
towns." Pursuant to this authority, the 1895 legislature estab-
lished a police court in each city and town.2 In 1975, the police
courts were renamed "city courts."23 Under section 3-11-205 of
the Montana Code, the offices of city judge and justice of the
peace may be combined. City courts have concurrent jurisdiction
with the justice courts in most civil actions and exclusive juris-
diction in certain types of civil actions.24
D. Criticism of "The People's Courts"
Early in this century, the Montana Supreme Court observed
that the justice of the peace courts were designed to be "a forum
serviceable to the people, where litigation may proceed without
the aid of attorneys or those familiar with the rules of plead-
ing. ... .2' An earlier New York case describes the office of jus-
tice of the peace:
The office of justice of the peace came down to us from remote
times. It existed in England before the discovery of America,
and it has existed here practically during our entire history,
both colonial and state, at first with criminal jurisdiction only,
21. See MONT. CONST. OF 1889, art. VIII, § 24. The 1972 Constitution does not
provide specifically for City Courts, police courts, or municipal courts, but states that
other courts may be provided by law.
22. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-11-101 (1995) (originally enacted as MONT. REV.
CODE ANN. § 11-1601 (Smith 1895)).
23. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-11-101(2) (1995) (originally enacted as MONT.
REV. CODE ANN. § 93-411 (Smith 1947)). Montana currently has 81 city courts. The
legislature authorized city councils in cities with populations of 4,000 or more to
establish municipal courts. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-6-101 (1995) (originally enacted
as MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 5094.1 (Smith 1935)). For years, Missoula was the only
city in Montana to exercise this authority and had the only municipal court in Mon-
tana. In January of 1997, both Kalispell and Billings converted their city courts to
municipal courts. The municipal court is a court of record, and municipal court judg-
es must have much the same qualifications as district court judges, including bar
admission. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 3-6-101(1), -202(1) (1995). The current Rules do
not apply to municipal court. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-30-101(2) (1995) (providing
that "the proceedings and practice in municipal court must be the same as in district
court," and, thus, that they be governed by the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure).
24. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-11-102(1) (1995). The Montana Code grants exclu-
sive jurisdiction of civil proceedings for the violation of a city or town ordinance,
actions for the collection of money or taxes due a city or town where the amount
claimed is less than $5,000, and various actions for less than $5,000 where the city
or town is either a formal party or has some relation to the litigation to the city
courts. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-11-103 (1995).
25. Reynolds v. Smith, 48 Mont. 149, 151, 135 P. 1190, 1191 (1913).
206 [Vol. 58
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but for more than two centuries past with civil jurisdiction ....
It exists in every state of the Union, and is regarded as of great
importance to the people at large, as it opens the doors of jus-
tice near their own homes, and not only affords a cheap and
speedy remedy for minor grievances as to the rights of proper-
ty, but also renders substantial aid in the prevention and pun-
ishment of crime."
Interestingly, the tradition of the justice court as everyperson's
court is still emphasized today by the so-called "Freemen," who
profess that the only judicial authority in the state is vested in
the justice courts.2"
Despite their rich heritage, Montanans occasionally have
criticized the organization of the justice of the peace courts and
the way they functioned in civil matters. In 1961, the Montana
Legislature proposed a constitutional amendment which would
have withdrawn justice courts from the list of constitutionally es-
tablished courts.2" The proposed amendment was narrowly de-
feated.
The justice courts remained, but criticism of them continued.
In 1967, Professors Mason and Crowley wrote, in the Montana
Law Review, that the justice of the peace and police courts actu-
ally did very little civil work, for which they were generally un-
qualified, resulting in great unwarranted expense to the State of
Montana.29 Citing the results of a 1967 Supreme Court ques-
tionnaire to sitting justices of the peace, Crowley and Mason ob-
26. People ex rel. Burby v. Howland, 49 N.W. 775, 776-77 (N.Y. 1898) (citations
omitted) (quoted in David R Mason & William F. Crowley, Montana's Judicial Sys-
tem-A Blueprint for Modernization, 29 MONT. L. REV. 1, 5 (1967)).
27. For instance, Judge Gregory Mohr, who serves as both Richland County
Justice of the Peace and Sidney City Court Judge, has had continuous contact with
various members of the Freemen over the past several years. He says that many of
the pleadings filed with his court contain references to the historical role of the jus-
tice court and the alleged lack of authority of the state and federal courts. For ex-
ample, in the criminal case pending against him, Freemen leader Rodney 0. Skurdal
filed with the court a "certified copy" of a book published in 1886 that discussed the
law relating to justices of the peace, their powers and duties, and the procedure in
justice courts, with forms of process and entries used therein. See WILLIAM L.
MURTREE, SEN., THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE: A COMPENDIUM, iii (1886).
Another quasi-legal document circulated by Westley Floyd Deitchler in connec-
tion with a criminal action arising out of his refusal to obtain a driver's license as-
serted that: "Justices of the Peace haven't been corrupted or dumbed down by law
school, but not one has the integrity with which to even want to know the law and
provide justice." Point of Order at 4, State v. Deitchler, No. 95 M 472 (Rosebud
County J. Ct. 1995).
28. See 1961 Mont. Laws 366 (eliminating constitutional status of justice of the
peace courts, police courts, and municipal courts).
29. See Mason & Crowley, supra note 26, at 19-23.
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served:
The justice of the peace courts in Montana are relatively inac-
tive in the civil field. [They] appear to function mainly, at pres-
ent, as misdemeanor courts for traffic offenses .... The consti-
tutional objective of having a "poor man's court" in which liti-
gants in actions involving small sums could get efficient and
substantial justice is not being effectuated."
Advocating abolition of the justice courts in favor of expanding
the number of legally-trained district court judges, Professors
Mason and Crowley concluded:
Abolition of inferior courts, reduction of the number of courts,
and expansion of qualified judges at the district court level, are
the dominant themes.... [T]he quality of justice dispensed will
be improved, and the respect of citizens for law enhanced, by
ceasing to expose them to courts which are in fact, as well as in
name, inferior."
Despite the professors' critique, the drafters of the 1972 Montana
Constitution retained the constitutionally mandated justice
courts and allowed the legislature to decide whether to abolish
the city courts.32
30. Id. at 21.
31. Id. at 41.
32. The majority proposal from the Judiciary Committee at the Constitutional
Convention, which ultimately passed, was to constitutionally mandate justice of the
peace courts as the original Constitution had done. The chair of the committee, attor-
ney David Holland, said: "Everybody who testified or who was polled were [sic] near
unanimous for the abolition of the justice of the peace from the Constitution." Mon-
tana Constitutional Convention, 1971-72, Verbatim Transcript, Vol. IV, pp. 1014.
Nonetheless, he stated that "as we begin to get some testimony from some of these
lawyers from the small towns . . . I begin to appreciate more and more that there's
just no way that this system of ours in the state can work out without a JP or the
equivalent of him . . . . So we left him in . . . ." Id.
The minority proposal advocated eliminating mention of the justice of the
peace courts from the constitution because 25 states had recently either abolished
justice courts or had eliminated them from that state's constitution, a poll of all
lawyers in Montana showed 66 lawyers in favor of retaining justice courts in the
constitution and 415 opposed, and a poll of trial lawyers showed 73 voted to abolish
justices of the peace and 38 voted to continue them. See Montana Constitutional
Convention at 1019-20. Despite the results of the polls, the minority did not support
abolition of the justice courts: "Because the justices of the peace are not specifically
named in Section 1 of the minority report, that does not mean at all that they have
been abolished. To the contrary. Their jurisdiction stays as it is today, but the Legis-
lature may in the future, under our article, do with those courts as time and events
require." Id., Vol. IV at 1020.
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E. Education of Judges
Since the Crowley and Mason article appeared, many have
sought to improve the courts of limited jurisdiction to ensure
that they are not, in fact, inferior to the rest of Montana's court
system. Because the judges who sit on the justice or city courts
are not required to be licensed attorneys or to have other spe-
cialized legal training before taking the bench, the legislature,
the Montana Supreme Court, and the limited jurisdiction judges
themselves have tried to standardize and increase the quality of
the education received by the judges after they take the
bench.33 The Commission conducts orientation training for new-
ly-elected judges, as well as mandatory biannual training ses-
sions for all judges throughout their terms. In 1985, the legisla-
ture mandated that justice and city court judges certify that they
have completed the orientation course before assuming their du-
ties. 4 Further, a judge's subsequent failure to attend the bian-
nual training sessions disqualifies him or her from office and cre-
ates a vacancy on that bench.35 At the end of every four years,
the Commission requires each judge to pass a certification exam-
ination. 6
33. However, the. voters may actually prefer that their justice and city court
judges be drawn from non-lawyer ranks. In the 1994 Missoula County primary for
one justice of the peace position, two of five candidates were lawyers. One had prac-
ticed as a prosecutor and a private civil attorney for a total of 17 years, the other
had clerked for five years for both the Montana Supreme Court and a Missoula
County District Court judge, and neither made it through the primary. The justice of
the peace, elected in the general election, was a retired Montana Highway Patrol
officer who had never attended law school or practiced law. Similarly, after Mike
Morris died in November of 1996, the Missoula County Commission received applica-
tions from 56 individuals seeking to replace him. Of those applicants, 20 were law-
yers. The Commission appointed a non-lawyer, Michael Jaworsky, who previously
worked as the vice-president of the Missoula Chamber of Commerce. See telephone
interview with Marie Pruitt, Personnel Services, Missoula County Office of Personnel
(Feb. 18, 1997).
34. 1985 Mont. Laws 237, 238 (codified as amended at MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-
10-203(3) (1995)).
35. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 31-10-203(3) (1995).
36. The biannual training sessions vary from three to five days, with between
24 and 40 hours of instruction per session. The subjects are taught in a four-year
cycle which is designed to comprehensively treat a variety of topics in depth. Pursu-
ant to Montana Supreme Court order of August 31, 1994, the Commission adopted a
formal written judicial education policy to "promote accountability for the material
covered during training conferences and provide an educational environment that is
conducive to learning." MONTANA SUPREME COURT COMMISSION ON COURTS OF LIM-
ITED JURISDICTION JUDICIAL EDUCATION POLICY, on file with author. Among other
new provisions, the policy states that judges are subject to testing during all training
conferences, in addition to the certification test given every four years.
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III. ATTEMPTS TO IMPROVE CIVIL PROCEDURE IN LIMITED
JURISDICTION COURTS
Improving the rules of procedure has been another focus for
those concerned with improving the operation of the justice and
city courts. Although the justice courts were meant to be "a fo-
rum ... where litigation may proceed without the aid of attor-
neys... "' even the simplest system needs some rules of oper-
ation. Until 1982, civil procedure rules in justice and city courts
were purely statutory and had been left largely unchanged since
the nineteenth century." Pleadings and practice in the justice
and city courts under these statutes followed the general pattern
of the Code of Civil Procedure for district courts, modified slight-
ly to ensure litigants could proceed "without the aid of those
familiar with the rules of pleading."39 Some of these statutory
provisions still govern procedure in the justice and city courts.'
A. The 1982 Rules
On July 15, 1982, the Montana Supreme Court adopted the
first version of the Montana Justice Court Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, a version nearly identical to that proposed by the Com-
mission." These twenty original rules became effective October
In addition to these required training sessions, members of the limited juris-
diction judiciary may take advantage of other educational opportunities. In 1994, the
University of Montana School of Law and the Commission developed a corollary to
the National Judicial College training. Thirty justices of the peace and city court
judges were accepted into the first Montana Judicial Institute, a two-year program.
Institute participants attended two weeks of rigorous classes in civil procedure, con-
stitutional law, torts, basic legal research, and computerized legal research during
the summer of 1994, as well as a day of long-distance video classes and a three-day
final session in the fall. In the second year of the Institute, the judges studied con-
tracts, criminal law and procedure, and remedies. Twenty-six judges graduated from
the program in April of 1996. The Institute was an enormous success; however, the
State Judicial Institute lacked funding to repeat the program in the summer of 1996.
The Montana School of Law and the Commission continue to seek alternative re-
sources to reinstate the program.
37. Reynolds v. Smith, 48 Mont. 149, 151, 135 P. 1190, 1190 (1913).
38. The Legislative Council Report on Justice of the Peace Courts noted that
though in 1895 the state legislature enacted a new code, "with respect to proceedings
in justice courts, the 1895 code remains basically unchanged today." See MONTANA
LEGISLATWVE REPORT, supra note 16, at 2.
39. Reynolds, 48 Mont. at 149, 135 P. at 1190 (quoted in David R. Mason &
Edward L. Kimball, Montana Justices' Court-According to the Law, 23 MONT. L.
REV. 62, 71 (1961)).
40. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 25-31-101 to -111 (1995) (listing 36 statutory
provisions on various procedures ranging from fees and commencement of actions
through execution of judgment).
41. In its order, the court observed that it was "proper that a uniform set of
14
Montana Law Review, Vol. 58 [1997], Iss. 1, Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol58/iss1/8
1997] JUSTICE COURT RULES 211
1, 1982.42
Though less expansive, the 1982 Justice Courts Rules were
modeled after the Montana and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
which govern practice in Montana's federal and state district
courts.' The 1982 Rules are scarce in coverage and detail. In
many instances, the 1982 Rules expressly reject more formal re-
quirements contained in the Montana and federal rules, attempt-
ing to offer a less intimidating, more user-friendly approach."
The drafters of the 1982 Rules successfully created a more mod-
ern and easy-to-use set of procedural guidelines. However, as the
courts of limited jurisdiction faced a marked increase in their
civil caseloads, it became clear that the 1982 Rules, which suffi-
ciently governed limited jurisdiction procedure in the 1980s,
needed further revision.
B. The Current Rules
In 1990, the Montana Supreme Court adopted a second and
much more complete set of rules for use in the justice and city
courts. The current Rules became effective June 1, 1990. 41 Cur-
such rules be adopted for practice and procedure in justice of the peace courts . . . "
and that it found the rules proposed by the Commission "acceptable and workable
with certain modifications." Order Adopting Rules of Procedure for Civil Cases in
Justices' Courts, In re Rules of Civil Pocedure for Justice Courts, 1 (Mont. July 15,
1982). While the title appears not to have applied to city court civil actions, the
Montana Code Annotated states: "All proceedings in civil actions in city courts
must . . . be conducted in the same manner as civil actions in justice court and
conform to the Montana Justice Court Rules of Civil Procedure." MONT. CODE ANN. §
25-32-101 (1989) (repealed 1991).
42. Although not codified per se, the Montana Justice Courts Rules of Civil
Procedure were reprinted in the Montana Code Annotated as Title 25, Chapter 22.
When the 1990 Rules superseded the 1982 version, Title 25, Chapter 22 was re-
placed by Title 25, Chapter 23.
43. The Annotations to the Montana Code include the Notes of the Civil Rules
Commission, which studied and recommended the adoption of the Montana Rules of
Civil Procedure to the Montana Supreme Court, and Comments by the Chapter Com-
piler. Both recognized that many of the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure are pat-
terned after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See MONT. CODE ANN. [tit. 25, ch.
20, chapter compiler's comments]; see also, David R. Mason, The Montana Rules of
Civil Procedure, 23 MONT. L. REv. 3 (1961).
44. For example, Rule 3, which told litigants how to begin a civil action, pro-
vided that the plaintiff may ifie either a concise statement in writing or "a copy of
the account, note, bill, bond, or instrument upon which the action is brought with a
statement of the amount due thereon . . . ." MONT. J. & CITY. CT. R. CIV. P. 3
(1982) (superseded 1990). Rule 7(D), concerning pleadings generally, specifically stated
that "all pleadings must be in writing and filed with the court; and need not be in
any particular form, but must be such as to enable a person of common understand-
ing to know what is intended." MONT. J. & CITY. CT. R. Civ. P. 7(D)(1) (1982) (su-
perseded 1990).
45. The Montana Justice and City Court Rules of Procedure have been
15
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rently, these Rules form the backbone of the practice and proce-
dure of justice and city courts across Montana and, thus, govern
a large and increasing part of the civil litigation in the state.'
Like the 1982 Rules, the current Rules are a much simpler adap-
tation of the Montana and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.47
IV. THE PROPOSED RULES
A. Overview
The current Rules are accomplishing their drafters' original
purposes in large part. Civil practice in the courts of limited
jurisdiction is now fairly uniform across Montana and generally
simpler than procedure in the state district courts. However, the
civil caseload of these courts has increased dramatically, forcing
them to encounter a larger variety of procedural situations. Ex-
perience has revealed some shortcomings in the current Rules
that can and should be remedied by the proposed Amendments.
In their attempt to draft Rules that are clear and easy to
amended only once since their adoption. In 1991, the Legislature enacted a bill al-
lowing the execution of a justice court judgment outside the county in which the
judgment was obtained without having to file an abstract of the judgment in district
court. Section 1, Chapter 285, L. 1991, amending M.C.A. Sec. 25-31-913. The code
previously had required the filing of an abstract of the justice court judgment with
the clerk of the district court, upon which the district court clerk could issue a state-
wide writ of execution. In turn, the legislature exercised its power to disapprove
Rules 21(C) and 23(2)(a) of the Montana Justice and City Court Rules of Procedure
which were inconsistent with the new legislation. Section 3, Chapter 285, L. 1991.
46. There are two additional sources for civil procedure in justice and city
courts in Montana: the Uniform Rules and local rules. The Supreme Court adopted a
set of Uniform Rules for the Justice and City Courts on March 25, 1993, effective
June 1, 1993. These Uniform Rules, like the Uniform Rules for the District Courts,
deal with matters which are more administrative than the Montana Justice and City
Court Rules of Procedure: allocation of cases in multi-judge courts, custody of files
and exhibits, form and quality of paper, presenting orders, decorum, office hours, and
continuances. See MONT. UNIF. R.J. & CITY CT. 2, 3, 4, 8, 15, 18.
The Uniform Rules also allow justice and city courts to adopt local rules, so
long as these rules are consistent with the Montana Justice and City Court Rules of
Procedure and the Uniform Rules. See MONT. UNIF. R.J. & CITY CT. 1(b). Only one
county, Missoula, appears to have adopted a local rule. This local rule requires all
litigants in both small claims actions and civil actions to submit their dispute to
mediation; small claims action must proceed to mediation before the pretrial confer-
ence and civil actions must proceed to mediation after the pretrial conference and be-
fore trial.
47. The current Rules proceed in the same order as the district court rules, but
omit many of the more detailed rules and certain subjects altogether. The result is
that the district court rules number one through 86, while the Montana Justice and
City Court Rules of Civil Procedure contain only 24 rules. Additionally, each rule
tends to abbreviate and simplify the district court rule.
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read, the drafters of the current Rules were, at times, overly
simplistic. Further, the current Rules are silent on issues that
are raised frequently in the limited jurisdiction courts and, thus,
provide no solution. Moreover, other sections of the current Rules
are still difficult to interpret and follow for those who do not
have extensive knowledge of the district court rules upon which
they were modeled. Finally, in at least one important instance,
the Rules directly conflict with statute.' As a result, the lit-
igation process in the courts of limited jurisdiction remains more
confusing and complex than it needs to be.
In 1995, the Commission appointed a subcommittee to study
the current Rules.49 This subcommittee drafted a set of pro-
posed Rules and circulated them among select judges of the jus-
tice and city courts for comment. The Commission approved the
subcommittee's modified version of the proposed Rules and
transmitted them to the Montana Supreme Court. The court met
with the members of the subcommittee in November 1996 to
discuss the proposed changes. During this meeting, the court and
subcommittee agreed on several additional modifications. Since
then, the subcommittee completed these changes and resubmit-
ted the proposed Rules to the court.5 ° The court will publish the
proposed Rules for public comment in the spring of 1997 before
finally deciding whether to adopt them.
B. The Subcommittee's General Goals
1. Explicitly Refer to Other Sources of Civil Procedure
To aid the users of the justice and city courts who have little
or no formal legal training, the proposed Rules are written as
clearly and comprehensively as possible. Further, the proposed
Rules attempt to alert readers to other provisions in the Rules or
in other sources that may address the same issue or procedure.
Currently, a non-lawyer, believing that the Rules are the only
source of civil procedure for these courts, could overlook an appli-
cable provision in the Montana Code, the Uniform Justice and
City Court Rules, or local rules. Wherever possible, the text of
48. Compare MONT. J. & CITY CT. R. Civ. P. 4(B)(1) (restricting the exercise of
personal jurisdiction to persons within the county or city where the justice or city
court is located) with MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-31-407 (1995) (allowing service of a
summons issued by a city or justice court outside the county where that court sits).
49. See supra note 3.
50. MONT. J. & CITY CT. R. CIv. P. 1-24 (proposed) [hereinafter proposed
Rules].
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the proposed Rules reminds the reader to consult other relevant
sources. These reminders may be redundant to a sophisticated
litigant, but are essential to ensure that "the people's courts" are
easy for the people to use.
To accomplish this goal, proposed Rule 1, "Scope of Rules,"
advises readers to consult the Uniform Rules and the Montana
Code for applicable provisions. 1 Additionally, other rules specif-
ically refer to supplemental rules and statutes. For example,
proposed Rule 2(A) indicates that the filing of a complaint begins
a civil action and also states that the specific requirements for a
complaint are set out in Rule 7. Again, such signposts may not
always be necessary, but should help make the Rules and courts
more user-friendly and efficient.
2. Eliminate Unnecessary and Confusing Provisions
The proposed Rules also attempt to make the current Rules
more clear and concise by eliminating unnecessary and irrele-
vant provisions. For example, current Rule 2, which states that
"there is one form of civil action," is an antiquated reference to
the merger of the courts of law and equity.5" However, the
courts of law and equity have been combined for a long time, and
most non-lawyers are sure to be more confused than enlightened
by this provision. The statutes, which grant subject matter juris-
diction to justice and city courts, clearly provide for the adjudica-
tion of both equitable and legal actions by these courts. 3 There-
fore, to eliminate the potential for creating doubt where none
should exist, the proposed Rules simply delete this reference.
3. Regulating Non-Lawyer Representation
Another problem that earlier versions of the Rules did not
foresee or address is the purported representation of parties by
non-lawyers. One reason for the justice and city courts is to en-
sure that "litigation may proceed without the aid of attorneys or
51. See proposed Rule 1.
52. See MONT. J. & CITY CT. R. CIv. P. 2 (corresponding with MONT. R. Civ. P.
2 and FED. R. CIV. P. 2, adopted respectively in 1962 and 1938).
53. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-10-301 (1995) (granting the justice courts civil
jurisdiction in actions for the recovery of money, which are clearly legal, and in ac-
tions to recover the possession of personal property and to issue certain temporary
restraining orders, which are clearly equitable). See also MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 3-11-
102, -103 (1995) (granting the same jurisdiction to the city courts and providing
additional exclusive jurisdiction for certain specified cases which include legal and
equitable remedies).
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those familiar with the rules of pleading."54 Parties can and do
speak on their own behalves without incurring attorneys' fees.55
A long standing Montana statute reinforces this concept and also
provides that a party may enlist the help of another "as attor-
ney" to act for him or her.56 However, neither the founders of
the peoples' courts nor the Montana Legislature foresaw that
these courts would be used by non-lawyers as a forum in which
they could represent litigants for profit.
The problem of non-lawyer representation has grown steadi-
ly with the increasing jurisdiction of the justice and city courts,
frequently arising in the context of debt collection by credit agen-
cies and paralegal practice.57 The party to the action pays a fee,
either contingent or hourly, and relies on someone else to handle
the action; but, neither the party, the opponent, nor the court
receive the corresponding benefit of obtaining the service of a
trained, practicing lawyer who is regulated by the State Bar and
supreme court of Montana.
The Montana Supreme Court addressed this issue in 1992 in
Sparks v. Johnson.58 The court held that non-lawyers may not
represent parties in justice and city courts on a regular and
recurring basis.59 The court narrowly interpreted section 25-31-
601 of the Montana Code Annotated to allow non-lawyer repre-
sentation by friends and relatives of a party to help that party at
a single proceeding. ° The Montana Supreme Court cited an
Iowa decision interpreting a similar statute barring non-lawyer
representation in justice courts which stated that "the salutary
purpose of the statute may not thus be perverted to encourage
the growth of a class of 'justice court lawyers,' unfettered by the
rules that bind licensed attorneys and without training in law
and ethics." "
54. Reynolds, 48 Mont. at 151, 135 P. at 1191.
55. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
56. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-31-601 (1995).
57. For example, the agency assumes responsibility for litigating the collection
action in return for a percentage of the recovery, in effect representing the creditor.
Many of these agencies then prosecute the action through non-attorney employees,
who are neither trained nor overseen by the State Bar of Montana.
58. 252 Mont. 39, 826 P.2d 928 (1992).
59. See id. at 44, 826 P.2d at 931.
60. See id. Sparks technically involved lay representation in a criminal action in
city court and held that section 25-31-601 of the Montana Code is limited to civil
litigation in justice courts. See id. at 42, 826 P.2d at 930. The court then held that
the statute was "not intended to permit the unauthorized practice of law; the intent
is to enable a friend or relative to assist and speak on behalf of a party at one pro-
ceeding." Id. at 44, 826 P.2d at 931.
61. Id. at 44, 826 P.2d at 930-31 (citing Bump v. Barnett, 16 N.W.2d 579, 582-
1997] 215
19
Ford: Civil Practice in Montana's "People's Courts"
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1997
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
Proposed Rule 2 addresses directly the issue of representa-
tion, following the Montana Supreme Court's holding in Sparks
v. Johnson.6" The rule states that an individual may represent
him or herself or use an attorney. 3 All others-agents, personal
representatives, corporations, partnerships, joint ventures, and
other legal or commercial entities-must file "through an attor-
ney."' Proposed Rule 2 still allows non-lawyers to have access
to and represent themselves in the people's courts, but requires
those who appear repeatedly on behalf of others for profit to be
subject to some regulation.65
While proposed Rule 2 does not explicitly provide for the
help of a friend or relative in a single proceeding in justice or
city court, the term "attorney" is defined in section 25-31-601 of
the Montana Code and interpreted by the Court in Sparks to
allow for such one-time help.6 Proposed Rule 2(A) does not ad-
vise litigants of this exception or direct them to the sources in
which it is found.67 The subcommittee felt that to keep the rule
clear and concise, the general rule should be stated clearly; how-
ever, the additional information about the exception and its
application will be found in the Committee Comments and in
this Article."
4. The Signature Requirement
The requirement that litigants represent themselves or be
represented by licensed attorneys is particularly important be-
cause of the ambiguity in the Rules governing the signing of
pleadings. Proposed Rules 2 and 7 both state clearly that
83 (Iowa 1944)).
62. See proposed Rule 2(A).
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. Hopefully, the fact that attorneys have formal legal training and have
passed the requirements for bar admission will obviate the need for intervention. In
the event that intervention is necessary, a court may use the Supreme Court Com-
mission on Practice for disciplinary proceedings and/or the impaired lawyers diversion
program currently being adopted, which are not available for non-lawyer "representa-
tives." Also, the State Bar Client Security Fund, which reimburses clients for mone-
tary losses caused by dishonest attorneys, requires that the client's claim be against
an active member of the Montana Bar.
66. See Sparks, 252 Mont. at 44, 826 P.2d at 931; MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-31-
601 (1995).
67. See proposed Rule 2(A).
68. Alternatively, section 25-31-601 of the Montana Code should be clarified by
the legislature. See infra notes 248-51 and accompanying text.
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pleadings must be signed.69 If the party is represented by coun-
sel, the attorney must sign all pleadings, and, if the party is
unrepresented, he or she must sign all pleadings." However,
unlike the federal and state rules," neither the current nor the
proposed Rule indicates what the signature on a pleading certi-
fies or provides for any penalty for violating the signing require-
ment.72
The subcommittee considered incorporating some aspects of
the federal or Montana rule 11 in the Rules' signature require-
ments, recognizing that some of the increased litigation in these
courts may in fact be frivolous. However, the subcommittee was
concerned that a certification requirement would unduly compli-
cate and restrict access to the courts at the beginning of a law-
suit and that enforcing purported violations of the certification
requirement would result in undue "satellite litigation," thus
postponing a decision on the merits, adding time and expense,
and increasing animosity between the parties. In the end, the
signature requirement remains simple and clear but, unfortu-
nately, lacking any deterrent value.
C. The Subcommittee's Venue Considerations
Prior to 1991, venue in the limited jurisdiction courts was
statutory.73 In 1991, most of the limited jurisdiction venue pro-
69. See proposed Rules 2(A), 7(E)(4).
70. See proposed Rule 7(FX4).
71. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11; MONT. R. Civ. P. 11. While the federal and Mon-
tana Rule 11 differ somewhat since the 1993 amendments to the federal rule, both
require parties to certify pleadings and both impose penalties for violation of the
certification provisions. See id.
The purpose of both the state and federal certification and sanction provisions
is to deter meritless litigation by requiring filers to "stop and think" before they
make unfounded allegations or indulge in an improper purpose. Prior to 1983, the
Montana and Federal rules were similar to the "toothless" signature requirement of
the current and proposed Justice and City Court Rule of Civil Procedure. See MONT.
J. & CITY CT. R. CIv. P. 7(D)(4); proposed Rule 7(F)(4).
72. See MONT. J. & CITY CT. R. Crv. P. 7(D)(4); proposed Rule 7(F)(4).
73. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 25-31-201 to -205 (1989) (repealed 1991), justice
court venue; MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 25-31-301 to -308 (1989) (repealed 1991), justice
court change of venue. The 1982 Rules also included place of trial and change of
venue provisions. See MONT. J. & CITY CT. R. CIv. P. 3(A), (B) (repealed 1991).
These simply repeat the language of the venue provisions of the Montana Code, but
are inconsistent with four other sections that state special venue rules for specific
types of cases. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 25-31-202 to -205 (1989) (repealed 1991).
After the Supreme Court adopted the 1982 rules, the Commission suggested that
these sections be repealed as "redundant"; however, in fact, those sections were not
repealed until 1991, after the adoption of the 1990 Rules.
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visions of the Montana Code were repealed, deferring to the
current Rules.74 To simplify, the drafters of the current Rules
elected to address venue within the Rules rather than to refer
litigants to the Montana Code provisions. Venue for both the
Montana District Courts and the United States District Court for
the District of Montana is still statutory.75
The current Rule 3 is more complete than its 1982 predeces-
sor, but has proven difficult for litigants and judges to under-
stand and apply.76 The subcommittee attempted to make the
Rule clearer and more understandable to even those users who
are not familiar with the concept of venue. Proposed Rule 3 affir-
matively states general principles and then contains additional
rules for specific circumstances.77 Much of proposed Rule 3 is
adopted from the district court venue rules, three major differ-
ences remain and are discussed below.
Proposed Rule 3(A) begins with a definition of the term
"venue," which is presumably unfamiliar to many non-lawyer
litigants and judges. Rule 3(A) then explains that there can be
more than one proper venue and that the determination of prop-
er venue depends on two factors: (1) the residence of the defen-
dant; and (2) the type of case before the court.78 If more than
one venue is proper, the plaintiff may choose between them.79
If, however, the plaintiff files the action in an improper venue,
There were no separate statutory provisions for city court venue, but the Mon-
tana Code provided that civil proceedings in city courts be conducted 'in the same
manner as civil actions in justices' courts," presumably including venue. MONT. CODE
ANN. § 25-32-101 (1989) (repealed 1991).
74. Section 25-31-205 of the Montana Code Annotated, venue for actions for
forcible entry or unlawful detainer, is the only statutory provision regarding venue in
justice court civil actions which was not repealed. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-31-205
(1995). It is not clear why this statute was not repealed as it is almost identical to
the 1990 Rules. Compare MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-31-205 (1995) (restricting venue for
actions for the recovery of possession of real property which is the subject of litiga-
tion to the county in which the property is situated) with MONT. J. & CITY CT. R.
CIV. P 3(A)(1)(e) (also restricting venue for actions for the recovery of possession of
real property which is the subject of litigation to the county in which the property is
situated).
75. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 25-2-113 to -206 (1995); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391 to
1412 (1996).
76. See MONT. J. & CITY CT. R. Civ. P. 3A(1) (providing for venue in justice
court).
77. As a matter of style, proposed Rule 3 eliminates the separate subsections
for justice court venue and city court venue because the same factors govern each.
78. See proposed Rule 3(A).
79. Compare proposed Rule 3(A) (governing proper place of trial) with MONT.
CODE ANN. §§ 25-2-101 to -131 (1995) (current rule regarding proper place of trial).
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the defendant may move to dismiss the action."
1. Effect of Residence of Defendant
Generally, the place of the defendant's residence is always a
proper venue.8' If no defendant resides in Montana, venue is
proper anywhere in Montana.12 This "venue anywhere" rule dif-
fers from the 1995 amendment to the district court venue statute
for tort actions.8 Specifically, in district court tort actions, a
litigant may not choose any venue if the non-resident party is a
corporation.' In revising the justice and city court venue rules,
the subcommittee chose to retain the original practice for all
defendants in all causes of action for the sake of simplicity.
2. Corporate Residence
Neither the venue statutes nor the current Rules define
which corporations are Montana residents or where the place of
residence within Montana is for corporate defendants who are
Montana residents. However, the United States Supreme Court
in Burlington Northern Railroad v. Fords" stated:
The Supreme Court of Montana has long held that a corpora-
tion does not "reside in the state" for venue purposes unless
Montana is its State of incorporation (citations omitted), and
that a Montana corporation resides in the Montana county in
which it has its principal place of business. In combination,
these venue rules, with exceptions not here relevant, permit a
plaintiff to sue a domestic corporation in just the one county
80. See infra notes 109-20 and accompanying text.
81. See MONT. J. & CITY CT. R. CIv. P. 3(A)(1)(a) (stating venue is always
proper in the county and/or city where the Montana defendant, or any one of the
Montana defendants, resides at the time the complaint is filed). The Montana Su-
preme Court has repeatedly held this to be the most basic of the venue rules. See,
e.g., Foley v. General Motors, 159 Mont. 469, 472, 499 P.2d 774, 475 (1972); Clark
Fork Paving v. Atlas Concrete, 178 Mont. 8, 12, 582 P.2d 779, 781 (1978).
82. Compare proposed Rule 3(A)(1)(a)-(d) with MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-2-118(2)
(1995). The U.S. Supreme Court upheld this statute from attack on equal protection
grounds. See Burlington N. R.R. v. Ford, 504 U.S. 648 (1992). See also Foley v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 159 Mont. 469, 472, 499 P.2d 774, 776 (1972); Truck Insurance
Exch. v. NFU Property & Cas., 149 Mont. 387, 427 P.2d 50 (1967); Hanlon v. Great
N. R.R., 83 Mont. 15, 20, 268 P. 547, 549 (1928).
83. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-2-122(2) (1995).
84. The plaintiff is limited to one of four choices of venue: (1) the county in
which the tort was committed; (2) the county in which the plaintiff resides; (3) the
county in which the corporation's resident agent is located; or (4) the first judicial
district. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-2-122(2) (1995).
85. 504 U.S. 648 (1995).
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where it has its principal place of business, while a plaintiff
may sue a foreign corporation in any of the State's fifty-six
counties.'
Justice Souter cited two cases for the proposition that the corpo-
rate residence is the county in which the corporation has its
principal place of business; however, the language in both cases
is only dicta.87 Furthermore, the Montana Supreme Court has
yet to deal squarely with the issue.88 Thus, not finding any pub-
lic policy or precedent to support the dicta in these cases, the
subcommittee considered the issue of residence for Montana
corporations anew. The proposed Rule now states the rules relat-
ing to corporations and venue clearly enough that litigants and
judges may understand them without the need to resort to Mon-
tana or United States Supreme Court cases.89
Proposed Rule 3(A)(1) specifies that the place of incorpora-
tion determines the state of residence for a corporation and that
a domestic corporation is a resident of each Montana county in
which it has a place of business.9 ° While this new provision al-
lows a plaintiff to choose between multiple "residences" of a
Montana corporate defendant who maintains multiple places of
business, the inconvenience to the defendant should be relatively
86. Id. at 651 (citations omitted).
87. See id. (citing Platt v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 222 Mont. 184, 721 P.2d 336
(1986)); see also Mapston v. Joint School Dist. No. 8, 227 Mont. 521, 740 P.2d 676
(1987).
88. In Platt, the plaintiff was injured in a residential swimming pool accident.
See 222 Mont. at 187, 721 P.2d at 338. The plaintiff, the swimming pool, and the
individual defendants who owned the pool were located in Lake County. See id. at
185, 721 P.2d at 337. The other two defendants were the manufacturer and distribu-
tor, corporations which apparently were not incorporated in Montana. See id. The
plaintiff filed her action in Silver Bow County; upon defendant's motion, the trial
court found that venue was improper and changed it to Lake County. See id. In
affirming the trial court's change of venue, the court stated "as foreign corporations,
Sears and the Muskin Corporation have no Montana residence for purposes of ven-
ue." Id. at 186, 721 P.2d at 337. Although technically dicta, the court went on to
say, "a Montana corporation has only one residence, the county in which it has its
principal place of business." Id. at 187, 721 P.2d at 338. However, the court cited no
authority, statutory or common law, for this proposition.
Similarly, in Mapston, the court did not hear or resolve squarely the issue of
the residence of a Montana corporation for venue purposes, but rather discussed
venue as it related to the school district. See 227 Mont. at 523, 740 P.2d at 677.
The court held that the "residence" of the school district was the county in which "it
has it's [sic] principal place of business." Id.
89. See proposed Rule 3(A)(1)(c).
90. See proposed Rule 3(A)(1). The Rule directs the reader to the correct office,
the Montana Secretary of State, to check whether the defendant corporation is incor-
porated in Montana. See id.
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slight.9 Further, by establishing a place of business in a partic-
ular location, the defendant has demonstrated a willingness and
ability to conduct business at that location and cannot reason-
ably expect to avoid litigation there.
3. Multiple Defendants
For cases involving multiple defendants, proposed Rule
3(A)(1) states that venue which is proper for any defendant in-
volved in an action is proper for all defendants, even if the venue
would be improper in a separate cause of action brought against
one particular defendant.92 This provision is new to the Rules,
but conforms to the district court venue statute93 and the com-
mon law in Montana. 94 This rule provides plaintiffs with an in-
centive for joining multiple defendants in a single action. This, in
turn, prevents multiple proceedings, conserves the resources of
the court, the parties, and the witnesses, and avoids potentially
inconsistent results. On the other hand, the rule provides a
temptation for a plaintiff to add a defendant who might not oth-
erwise be joined solely to acquire another possible venue.95
However, the subcommittee determined that the benefits of the
Rule outweighed the risk of this possible misuse, in part because
no significant abuse of the similar district court provision has
been reported since its enactment.
91. See id.
92. See proposed Rule 3(A)(1)(d).
93. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-2-117 (1995).
94. See, e.g., Weiss v. Montana, 219 Mont. 447, 712 P.2d 1315 (1986).
95. In the courts of limited jurisdiction, as in district court, venue is deter-
mined by reference to the factors which exist at the time of the commencement of
the lawsuit. See MONT. J. & CITY CT. R. CIv. P. 3(B). Thus, the defendant's resi-
dence on the date the complaint is filed is determinative, even if the defendant
moves to another venue the next day. See Emery v. Federated Foods, Inc., 262 Mont.
83, 88, 863 P.2d 426 (1993). Therefore, dropping a defendant after the complaint is
filed will not change the venue, even if they were originally included only for venue
purposes. See id. at 88, 863 P.2d at 426.
In the district courts, Rule 11 of the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure may
act as a check on the practice of using a defendant for venue purposes, see MONT. R.
Civ. P. 11, but neither the current nor the proposed Rules contain a Rule 11 corol-
lary. However, given the relatively limited recoveries at stake in the justice and city
courts and the large number of pro se litigants, the danger that this tactic will be
abused in these courts is low.
1997] 221
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4. Additional Proper Venues
Having established the general principles, proposed Rule
3(A)(2) sets out specific causes of action in which other venues
may also be proper.96 Generally, a venue other than the
defendant's residence may be used when there is some connec-
tion between the events giving rise to the cause of action and a
county or city other than the defendant's home venue.
a. Contract Cases
For contract actions, the place of performance of the contract
is an additional proper venue.97 Like the district court provi-
sion, proposed Rule 3(A) gives parties to a contract the first
opportunity to specify its place of performance; however, in the
event that the parties do not so specify, proposed Rule 3(A)(2)
defines place of performance more broadly than the comparable
district court statute.98 Rule 3(A)(2) recognizes that there may
be multiple places of performance for a single contract and al-
lows a plaintiff to sue in the venue where the performance was
supposed to have occurred.99 Thus, in a contract for the sale of
personal property across county lines, the seller whose payment
was due in his or her home county may sue for non-payment
there, while a buyer who paid the seller in the seller's county but
did not receive the goods the seller promised may sue for non-de-
livery in the buyer's county.
100
96. See proposed Rule 3(A)(2).
97. See proposed Rule 3(A)(2)(a); see also MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-2-121(1)(b)
(1995).
98. Compare proposed Rule 3(A)(2)(a) with MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-2-121(1)(b)(i)
(1995).
99. See proposed Rule 3(A)(2)(a).
100. See, e.g., Peenstra v. Berek, 188 Mont. 489, 614 P.2d 520 (1980). The defen-
dant made a down payment on furniture in a Flathead County furniture store with
the understanding that he would pay the rest once the furniture was delivered to his
residence in Cascade County. See id. at 490, 614 P.2d at 521. The plaintiff furniture
store filed suit in Flathead County after it delivered the furniture to the defendant
buyer, and he refused to pay. The buyer moved to change venue to Cascade County,
alleging that was the place of performance. See id. The Supreme Court affirmed the
district court's denial of the change of venue, stating:
the express terms of the contract provide that the seller was to perform by
making delivery in Great Falls, but that the buyer should perform by mak-
ing payments in Kalispell. The seller fully performed, but the buyer alleged-
ly has failed to perform his obligations which are to be performed in Flat-
head County.
Id. at 491, 614 P.2d at 521.
But, cf. MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-2-121(2) (1995). After Peenstra, the legislature
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The subcommittee chose to incorporate the "multiple places
of performance" rule for the courts of limited jurisdiction because
the amounts sued upon are smaller than in district court, and,
thus, having to travel to a distant venue is more likely to dis-
suade a litigant with a meritorious claim. Further, under this
rule, the plaintiff who sues in the place where the defendant
promised, but allegedly failed to perform, is in effect substituting
the lawsuit for the promised performance and is not imposing an
unexpected burden on the defendant.
b. Tort Cases
In tort actions, the subcommittee chose a nearly opposite
approach. Proposed Rule 3(A)(2)(b) allows one additional proper
venue, the place where the injury was incurred.' °' The drafters
changed the language of the current Rule, which allows venue
"where the injury was committed," to avoid the recent confusion
in the district courts about the meaning of the term "committed"
when the defendant's act occurs in one place but the injury to
the plaintiff results in another. °2 The Montana Supreme Court
has interpreted the phrase to mean that the tort is committed
where the defendant's tortious conduct occurred, even if the
amended section 25-2-121(2) of the Montana Code to list the place of performance for
particular categories of contracts, regardless of which party has breached its obliga-
tion. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-2-121(2) (1995). For instance, the proper county for
"contracts for the sale of property or goods: the county where possession of the prop-
erty or goods is to be delivered . . . ." Id.
101. See proposed Rule 3(A)(2)(b).
102. In district court tort cases, the one proper place for trial is "the county
where the tort was committed." MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-2-122(1)(b). The statute does
not define the word "committed." See MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-2-122(a)(b) (1995). The
Montana Supreme Court has held "for purposes of venue, a tort is committed where
there is a concurrence of breach of obligation and the occasion of damages." Whalen
v. Snell, 205 Mont. 299, 302, 667 P.2d 436, 437 (1983) (holding that in a suit for
non-payment of fees, "the obligation [ius breached, if at all, where payment [ius to be
made.").
See also Howard v. Dooner Laboratories, Inc., 211 Mont. 312, 688 P.2d 279
(1984). In that case, the alleged medical malpractice occurred at the doctor's office in
Yellowstone County, but the patient did not suffer any ill effects until she filled the
prescription in Fergus County. See id. at 313, 688 P.2d at 279. The Court held that
the tort exception did not authorize venue in Fergus County and that the tort was
'committed" in the county of the defendant's residence. See id. at 313-14, 699 P.2d at
279-80. But cf. Gabriel v. School Dist. No. 4, 264 Mont. 177, 870 P.2d 1351 (1994)
(considering section 25-2-126(3) of the Montana Code, which governs venue for ac-
tions against political subdivisions, and holding that the wrongful death claim "arose"
where the death occurred, even though the negligence and injuries that led to the
death happened in another county).
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plaintiff is injured elsewhere."°3 In many cases, this interpreta-
tion means that the alternative venue is, in fact, no alternative
at all; the only resulting proper venue is the defendant's place of
residence. In district court cases with large sums at stake, it
may be reasonable to expect an injured plaintiff to travel to a
distant location to press a claim. However, for an injured plain-
tiff bringing an action in the justice or city courts, traveling to
the defendant's home venue simply may not be worth the maxi-
mum compensation of $5,000.
A defendant who is sued in a venue where the injury is
incurred, but where he or she may have never been, also must
decide whether defending a suit in a distant venue is worth the
possible $5,000 judgment. It may be true that this defendant
could not have foreseen that the injury would occur at a dis-
tance, but the substantive law holds the defendant liable for
unforeseen injuries so long as the defendant should have antici-
pated some form of injury.'" This venue rule merely extends
this reasoning to place. Few cases involve a geographic split
between act and injury, but for those that do, the proposed rule
attempts to balance the rights of both parties while maintaining
reasonable access to the judicial system.
c. Unlawful Detainer Cases
Proposed Rule 3 makes a simple but significant change in
venue for unlawful detainer actions.' Under this rule, plain-
tiffs may choose the defendant's place of residence in addition to
the location of the real property in dispute as a proper ven-
ue."° Since 1895, plaintiffs have been required to sue for re-
covery of possession of real property in the county where the
property was located, even if the defendant resided else-
where. 7 This traditional venue rule is inconsistent with the
general rule and unnecessarily inconveniences defendants. Be-
103. See Howard, 211 Mont. at 314, 688 P.2d at 280.
104. See Mize v. Rocky Mountain Bell Tel. Co., 38 Mont. 521, 532, 100 P. 971,
973 (1909); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 6068 (1907) (recodified at MONT. CODE ANN. §
27-1-317(1995)).
105. See proposed Rule 3(A)(2)(d).
106. See id.
107. See MONT. J. & CITY CT. R. Civ. P. 3(A)(1)(e), (2)(e); see also MONT. CODE
ANN. § 25-31-205 (1995) (providing that the only proper venue for an action to recov-
er real property, for injuries to real property, partition of real property, and the
foreclosure of liens and mortgages on real property is the county in which the realty
is located).
224 [Vol. 58
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cause a plaintiff may now execute upon justice court judgments
in any county in the state,"'8 simplicity and convenience dictate
that the plaintiff be able to bring suit in the defendant's place of
residence, obtain a judgment for unlawful detainer in that coun-
ty, and enforce that judgment by writ of execution directed to the
sheriff of the county in which the property is located. The plain-
tiff still retains the option of suing where the property is located,
but the defendant's convenience is finally considered.
5. Dismissal for Improper Venue: Rule 3(B)
The changes to Rule 3(B) are meant to clarify, not alter, the
current practice in cases of improper venue.' In justice and
city courts, cases filed in improper venues are dismissed without
prejudice." Because the justice and city courts have limited
support staffs and resources, the subcommittee determined that
the responsibility for filing in the correct court should fall on the
plaintiff, not on the clerk of court. In district court, venue is not
jurisdictional,"' and the court may not dismiss an action on its
own motion for improper venue."' The proposed Rule 3(B) pro-
vides that a party who believes that venue is improper must
either move to dismiss the action on that ground at least ten
days before trial or waive the motion."' The rule clearly states
that a court that is presented with a timely motion that demon-
strates improper venue must grant the motion and dismiss the
suit without prejudice." 4
108. See MONT. J. & CITY CT. R. CIrv. P. 23(A).
109. See proposed Rule 3(B).
110. Cf MONT. R. CIv. P. 12(bXii) (stating the remedy for improper venue in
district court is an order to change venue to the proper county).
111. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Miller, 189 Mont. 356, 366, 616 P.2d 313, 320
(1980).
112. See, e.g., State ex rel. Gnose v. District Court of Deer Lodge County, 30
Mont. 188, 189, 75 P. 1109, 1109 (1904) (stating that "the court cannot act of its
own motion, for, while a party may have an absolute right to a change of venue, it
is a right which he may waive, and the court is without authority to invoke the
statute in his behalf (citation omitted)).
113. See proposed Rule 3(B)(1). The subcommittee imposed this new deadline for
the filing of motions to dismiss for improper venue to prevent defendants from
changing venue on the morning of the trial. The subcommittee decided that because
of the relative lack of legal expertise among litigants, the added strain on judicial
resources, the added time between pleading and trial, and the fact that civil litiga-
tion in justice and city courts usually involves much less in the way of pretrial pro-
cedure than district court practice, the deadline should be shorter than in district
court. See MONT. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(iii) (imposing, generally, a 20-day deadline after the
filing of the answer except in cases where an event occurs that will prevent an im-
partial trial or where impartiality arises after the 20-day period).
114. See proposed Rule 3(B)(1). In district court, the court must grant a motion
1997]
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In the event an improper venue motion is granted, the pro-
posed Rule 3(B) instructs plaintiffs that they must refile in a
proper venue and pay another filing fee and advises them of the
risk that the statute of limitations may toll."' While these con-
sequences may be apparent to attorneys who are familiar with
the Rules, this rule ensures that a non-lawyer litigant who has
filed in an improper venue will have enough information to refile
correctly.
Different from the practice in district court,"6 a decision on
a motion to dismiss for improper venue in the courts of limited
jurisdiction is not immediately appealable."7 Because a limited
jurisdiction litigant who receives an incorrect venue ruling likely
will not be prejudiced by waiting the relatively short time until
after trial to have the ruling reviewed, the drafters determined
that the case should be taken to its conclusion in the justice or
city court."8 Further, on appeal to the district court from jus-
tice or city court, the dissatisfied party gets a trial de novo."9
If the district court judge determines that the original venue was
wrong, he or she may transfer the case to the proper venue prior
to the trial de novo.
120
6. Other Venue Issues: Rule 3(C)
When the plaintiff files in a proper venue but the trial of the
action must take place elsewhere for other reasons, the case is
transferred to the new venue rather than being dismissed with-
out prejudice.' 21 Rule 3(C) recognizes only four grounds for
for change of venue when the plaintiff files in an improper county. See MONT. CODE
ANN. § 25-2-201(1) (1995); see, e.g., Johnson v. Clark, 131 Mont. 454, 460, 311 P.2d
772, 776 (1957).
115. See proposed Rule 3(B)(1).
116. See MONT. R. APP. P. 1(b)(2) (allowing a party in district court to imme-
diately appeal an order changing or refusing to change the place of trial).
117. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-33-101 (1995) (requiring a final judgment before
appeal to the district court).
118. The committee also deleted language that purported to instruct the district
courts on how to deal with the motions in a case on appeal. The Montana Code
contains specific procedures which the district court must follow in appeals from
justice or city court. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 25-33-101 through -306 (1995).
119. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-33-301(1) (1995) (providing for trial de novo and
stating that [e]ach party has the benefit of all legal objections made in the justice's
or city court"); MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-33-302 (1995) (setting forth the procedure to
be followed when a judgment is reversed or set aside on a question of law arising in
the lower court).
120. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-33-301 (1995).
121. See proposed Rule 3(C). To clarify the difference between transfer and dis-
missal, this Rule specifically prohibits the collection of an additional filing fee by the
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change of venue if the original filing was in a proper location: (1)
the judge is a material witness; (2) a fair trial is impossible be-
cause of bias or prejudice among the prospective jurors; (3) the
judge is disqualified; or (4) the judge is sick or unable to pre-
side.122 To obtain a change of venue in the first two instances, a
party must submit an affidavit that establishes the basis for the
motion.' However, in the event the judge is disqualified or
sick, no affidavit is necessary." The court must assess the evi-
dence before it, and, if it appears to the satisfaction of the judge
that one of the four grounds is met, the he or she may grant a
change of venue.'2
If the parties cannot agree upon a new venue, the original
court shall choose the new venue.'26 Because there may not be
another court in the same county,'27 proposed Rule 3(C) deletes
earlier language limiting the transfer to courts in the same coun-
ty," but requires the transferring judge to try to keep the case
close-to transfer to "the nearest appropriate court in which the
judge agrees to accept the case."'29 Proposed Rule 3(C) also de-
letes the previous limit on the number of times a party may
transferee court. See id.
122. See proposed Rule 3(C)(1). Like all other judges in Montana, justice and city
court judges may not sit in actions in which they are a party, are related to a party
or an attorney, or have represented a party. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-1-803 (1995).
Further, they are automatically disqualified when under a felony indictment or infor-
mation and during supreme court review of a recommendation for removal by the
Judicial Standards Commission. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-1-1109 (1995). In all other
cases, a party seeking to unseat a judicial officer for a particular case must show
cause. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-1-805 (1995).
123. See proposed Rule 3(C)(1)(a), (b). The party must allege facts showing per-
sonal bias or prejudice on the part of the judge. In addition to the affidavit, counsel
for the moving party must sign and file a certificate that the affidavit was made in
good faith. See id.
124. See proposed Rule 3(C)(1)(c), (d). The disqualification is not automatic; an-
other judge conducts a disqualification hearing before deciding whether the original
judge should continue to sit on the case. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-1-805(1) (1995).
125. See proposed Rule 3(C)(1).
126. See proposed Rule 3(C)(2).
127. The 1972 Constitution requires only one justice of the peace in each county,
although the legislature has the authority to provide for additional justices of the
peace in any county. See MONT. CONST., art. VII, § 5. The Montana Code currently
provides for at least one justice court in each county and authorizes county commis-
sioners to add more courts under certain circumstances. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-
10-101 (1995). Beaverhead, Blaine, Carbon, Cascade, Chouteau, Fergus, Gallatin,
Granite, Judith Basin, Lincoln, Missoula, Ravalli, Roosevelt, Rosebud, Silver Bow,
and Yellowstone Counties all have more than one justice court.
128. See MONT. J. & CITY CT. R. CirV. P. 3(C)(5).
129. See proposed Rule 3(C)(2).
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move to change venue,13 ° accommodating the rare circumstanc-
es in where similar problem arise in the transferee court.
To prevent defendants from using motions for change of
venue as a dilatory tactic, the judge in the new venue must issue
a notice of the time and place set for trial as soon as he or she
receives the file.'31 To ensure that the transferee court exercis-
es its power to move the case along to its resolution, the court
should order the defendant to file an answer within ten days of
the court's order if the file does not contain one.'32
D. Other Suggested Amendments
1. Payment of Court Fees: Rule 2(B)
Another problem that has surfaced since the adoption of the
current Rules is the non-payment of fees. In some cases, plain-
tiffs faced with a looming statute of limitations have successfully
convinced the clerk of court to file the complaint, but to postpone
collecting the statutorily required filing fee.'33 Once the clerk
accepts the complaint, the statute of limitation arguably is
tolled, and, subsequently, collecting the fees has proved difficult.
Proposed Rule 2 adds a subsection that specifically instructs
clerks and judges faced with this situation not to allow filing of a
complaint without the payment of the fee."M Filing a complaint
without paying the fee will no longer toll the statute of limita-
tions."
2. Personal Jurisdiction: Rule 4
Proposed Rule 4 discusses personal jurisdiction, the power of
the court to render a judgment binding on the parties before
130. See MONT. J. & CITY CT. R. CIrv. P. 3(C)(3).
131. See proposed Rule 3(C)(5).
132. See id. The 10-day limit is shorter than the original 20 days for an answer
given to defendants under the current Rule. See MONT. J. & CITY CT. R. Crv. P.
5(A).
133. Interview with participating judges, Montana Justice Institute, at the Uni-
versity of Montana School of Law, Missoula, Mont. (Summer, 1994).
134. See proposed Rule 2(B). Several of the judges in attendance at the Montana
Justice Institute had faced this situation and expressed a desire for clear guidance
on the issue. Because most of the courts are in small communities, silence in the
Rules has subjected the judges and clerks to personal pressure to accept late filing
fees. However, the clear statement in an outside authority should prevent this. In-
terview with participating judges, Montana Justice Institute, at University of Mon-
tana School of Law, Missoula, Mont. (Summer, 1994).
135. See proposed Rule 2(B).
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it."' In very few words, the amendment to Rule 4 significantly
expands the courts' personal jurisdiction. Under proposed Rule
4(B), city and justice court judges have statewide personal juris-
diction. 137
Currently, much confusion exists regarding the personal
jurisdiction of the city and justice courts. Section 3-10-304 of the
Montana Code limits the personal jurisdiction of a justice court
to the county in which it is located.18 However, section 25-31-
407 of the Montana Code, to which section 3-10-304 explicitly
refers, imposes special requirements for summonses served out
of the justice court's county without explaining how such service
can be possible if the court's jurisdiction is limited to its county's
boundaries. 139 Furthermore, the entry of judgment in a justice
court appears to have statewide effect."
The 1982 and current Rules give a cursory treatment of the
issue of the limits of the court's personal jurisdiction, stating
that "[a]ll persons are subject to the jurisdiction of a justice or
city court who are found within the county or city, respectively,
or who can be served as provided in these rules." 4' This rule
does not clearly instruct litigants how to resolve the apparent
conflict between the territorial limit imposed by section 3-10-304
of the Montana Code and the expanded jurisdiction offered by
section 25-31-407 of the Montana Code.
Many of the city and justice court judges believe that they
do have statewide personal jurisdiction and act on that belief
daily." The judges with whom the subcommittee spoke felt
136. See proposed Rule 4.
137. See proposed Rule 4(B)(1) (stating that "all persons are subject to the juris-
diction of a justice or city court who reside or are found within the State of Mon-
tana"). The subcommittee decided not to attempt to give the courts of limited juris-
diction long-arm jurisdiction over defendants not found within the state of Montana
because it would be overly complicated.
138. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-10-304 (1995) (stating that "the civil jurisdiction
of a justice's court extends to the limits of the county in which it is held, and mesne
and final process of a justice's court in a county may be issued to and served in any
part of the county").
139. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-31-407 (1995).
140. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-31-914 (1995) (stating that a justice court judg-
ment can be used to create a lien in any county where the defendant owns real
property). The current Rule 23(A)(1) allows judgments to be enforced within the
boundaries of the county or city in which the judgment was obtained by a writ of
execution, while Rule 23(A)(2) appears to allow the procedure authorized by section
25-31-914 of the Montana Code. See MONT. J. & CITY CT. R. Civ. P. 23(A)(1), (2).
141. See MONT. J. & CITY CT. R. CrV. P. 4(B)(1) (1982) (repealed); MONT. J. &
CITY CT. R. Crv. P. 4(B)(1).
142. Interview with participating judges, Montana Justice Institute, at the Uni-
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strongly that it would not be fair to allow alleged wrongdoers to
escape the consequences of their wrongs unless the plaintiff
travels to the home county or city of the defendant and sues
there." Further, the judges report that in practice, they rare-
ly, if ever, face any challenge to their assertion of statewide
personal jurisdiction, even when the defendant lives on one side
of the state and is served with process on the other.'" Techni-
cally, a defendant who answers without asserting lack of person-
al jurisdiction waives this defense."' In the courts of limited
jurisdiction, where so many defendants are pro se and so many
judges are confused about the scope of the courts' personal juris-
diction, most of these waivers are more likely unwitting than
voluntary. Most litigants probably assume that if a court issued
a summons, it must have jurisdiction.
The subcommittee thought it essential to clarify the juris-
dictional boundaries of justice and city courts and to suggest
legislative changes to make the statutes consistent." As a
matter of policy, allowing statewide jurisdiction satisfies these
criteria. Even in 1961, the legislative council noted: "Territorial
jurisdiction is limited to counties, and this also restricts the
effectiveness of a J.P. court."'47 Today, the increasing civil case-
load and amount of money at issue in justice and city courts, as
well as the vastly improved communications and transportation
around the state, weigh even more strongly in favor of statewide
jurisdiction and enforcement of decrees.
versity of Montana School of Law, Missoula, Mont. (Summer, 1994); interview with
participating judges, Fall Training Conference, at the University of Montana,
Missoula, Mont. (Fall, 1994). At the conferences, when I suggested that the statute
may override the inconsistent rule and, thus, that the judges' personal jurisdiction
technically might be limited to their counties, many judges expressed strong dis-
agreement. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. The judges I spoke with also indicated that they regularly issue sum-
monses for defendants in other counties. Id.
145. See MONT. J. & CITY CT. R. CwV. P. 4(B)(2). This rule provides for acquisi-
tion of jurisdiction by "voluntary appearance" as well as by service; therefore, appear-
ing without raising the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction waives that defense.
See id. The proposed Rule makes no change. See proposed Rule 4(B)(2).
146. See proposed Rule 4(B)(1); see also supra notes 44-47 and accompanying
text.
147. MONTANA LEGISLATIVE REPORT, supra note 18, at 3.
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3. Language of the Summons: Rule 4(C)
The only other significant change in Rule 4 is in the form of
the summons.'" The current Rule 4 requires the summons to
contain a statement directing the defendant to appear and file a
written answer within twenty days of service of the summons
and complaint." 9 In many actions filed in the courts of limited
jurisdiction, federal law requires the plaintiff to give the defen-
dant more than twenty days to answer.5 ° Some have tried to
solve this dilemma by stating in the summons that the defen-
dant had the federally-required number of days in which to an-
swer; however, some justice and city court judges have strictly
interpreted the rule and not allowed summonses giving the fed-
erally-required number of days. To alleviate this problem, the
proposed Rule allows the defendant twenty days, "unless oth-
erwise provided by law," in which to answer. 5'
4. Late Filing of Answers: Rule 5
Proposed Rule 5 governs service and filing of pleadings and
other documents and seeks to eliminate doubt about whether the
defendant may answer after the specified time has expired.'52
Proposed Rule 5 clearly states that this practice is acceptable,
adopting a party-centered adversarial approach and rejecting a
technical interpretation that would interfere with the overall
goal of trial on the merits." Thus, the plaintiff who wishes to
enforce the twenty-day deadline must proceed under Rule 21 and
obtain a default; the court will not do so on its own.M
148. See proposed Rule 4(B)(2).
149. See MONT. J. & CITY CT. R. CIV. P. 4(C)(2)(b).
150. See, e.g., Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(4) (1994)
(requiring creditors to allow the debtor at least 30 days to respond to the first notice
of collection).
151. See proposed Rule 5(A).
152. See proposed Rule 5.
153. See id.
154. See proposed Rule 21(A)(8). The other changes to Rule 5 are similarly dis-
pensable for systems where most litigants and judges are trained in the law, but are
needed to give clear guidance to those with less formal legal education and experi-
ence. For example, proposed Rule 5 explains in detail the procedure to be followed in
filing pleadings. See proposed Rule 5(B).
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5. Pleadings Generally: Rule 7
Proposed Rule 7(A) requires that the complaint state not
only the facts giving rise to the action, but also the "type and
amount of relief requested."'55 This new requirement enables
the defendant and court to assess whether the court has subject
matter jurisdiction over the case. Because the limited subject
matter jurisdiction of the justice and city courts is determined by
the dollar amount of the plaintiffs claim,156 the plaintiffs com-
plaint must include a statement of the amount and type of relief
sought.
Counterclaims and cross-claims have been another source of
controversy in the courts of limited jurisdiction because the cur-
rent Rules do not address them. However, Proposed rule 7 states
unequivocally that "cross-claims are not allowed." 57 For justice
and city courts-where amounts in dispute are limited and sim-
plicity is a virtue-the complexity inherent in deciding issues
between co-parties is overly burdensome. Although those co-par-
ties will have to file a separate action to resolve other disputes,
and thus may suffer some duplication of effort and expense, the
speed and ease with which the case between the original oppo-
nents can be resolved greatly outweighs this inconvenience.
Counterclaims between opposing parties are allowed in the
courts of limited jurisdiction." Under the current Rules, as in
district court,'59 some counterclaims are permissive while those
which arise out of the same transaction or occurrence are man-
datory; that is, if they are not raised in the primary action, they
will be waived. The policy behind the mandatory counterclaim
rule is to encourage resolution of all disputes between two par-
ties relating to the same facts in a single lawsuit, thereby avoid-
ing unnecessary and wasteful duplication of the resources of the
courts and parties. Proposed Rule 7 rephrases this rule to make
it easier to understand and apply. 6 °
Proposed Rule 7(C) also addresses the important and recur-
ring situation in which the defendant seeks to recover in the
counterclaim more than the jurisdictional limit of the justice or
155. Proposed Rule 7(A).
156. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-10-301 (1995) (justice court); MONT. CODE ANN. §
3-11-103 (1995) (city court).
157. Proposed Rule 7(E).
158. See MONT. J. & CITY CT. R. CIV. P. 7(C); proposed Rule 7(C).
159. See MONT. R. CIrv. P. 13.
160. See proposed Rule 7.
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city court.161 The previous version of the rule did not clearly
provide for this situation, and courts throughout Montana
treated such counterclaims inconsistently.
However, in 1993, the Montana Supreme Court decided Bell
v. Justice Court of Rosebud County,162 granting a petition for
supervisory control over a justice court judge. In the underlying
action, the plaintiffs sued for less than $5,000, but the defen-
dants counterclaimed for $50,000.1 The justice court judge
proposed trying the plaintiffs claim and the defendant's counter-
claim up to $5,000 in justice court and then sending the defen-
dants to district court to seek the rest of the alleged counter-
claim damages.' The Montana Supreme Court held that the
justice court judge should have acknowledged that she had no
subject matter jurisdiction because of the amount claimed.1"
The court voiced concern about the possibility of a duplication of
trials and the denial of complete recovery by the defendant."6
To avoid these problems, the court ruled that the entire case in
justice court should be dismissed, and both parties should be
required to pursue their claims in district court.16
Proposed Rule 7(C) incorporates the Bell holding in part,
specifying that a counterclaim which exceeds the jurisdictional
limit of the court must be dismissed without prejudice."6 This
provision also complies with the reasoning of the Montana Su-
preme Court in Reynolds v. Smith,169 which held that "the ju-
risdiction of the [justice] court is dependent not upon the amount
which plaintiff might recover, but upon the amount which he de-
mands."7' The proposed rule does not require that the case be
161. See proposed Rule 7(C).
162. 257 Mont. 543, 857 P.2d. 739 (No. 93-174, 1993).
163. See id.
164. See id. This procedure appears to conform to the Montana Code. See MONT.
CODE ANN. § 25-31-906 (1995) (providing that "[w]hen the amount found due to ei-
ther party exceeds the sum for which the justice is authorized to enter judgment,
such party may remit the excess and judgment may be entered for the residue").
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. See id.
168. See proposed Rule 7(C)(1).
169. 48 Mont. 149, 135 P. 1190 (1913).
170. Id. at 151, 135 P. at 1191. At the time of the Reynolds decision, the justice
of the peace courts were limited to cases not exceeding $300. The plaintiffs total
demand was within the court's subject matter jurisdiction; however, a Montana stat-
ute imposed a penalty which made the amount in controversy greater than $300. See
id. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment for the plaintiff, citing the Revised
Code of Montana (now MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-31-906) "which allows the prevailing
party to remit any excess over the amount fixed as the limit of the jurisdiction of a
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dismissed, but gives the defendant the option of refiling the
counterclaim in district court.17' If the defendant proceeds to
district court after the counterclaim is dismissed in the justice or
city court, the district court may order that the plaintiffs justice
or city court action be transferred to the district court.'72 Prob-
lems with Rule 7(C) still remain. A defendant wishing to avoid
justice or city court now has a clear incentive to counterclaim
and to exaggerate the damage allegations.'73 However, in the
absence of empirical evidence that litigants actually abuse the
counterclaim rule to avoid justice court, the subcommittee
thought that the proposed Rule represented a reasonable com-
promise considering the clear limit to the subject matter jurisdic-
tion of the justice and city courts.
6. Amendment of Pleadings: Rule 8
The current Rule 8, governing amendment of pleadings, is
less formal than the corresponding rule in district court. 74 It
allows amendment "by written motion at the discretion of the
court" without giving the court any guidance about when and
why to exercise that discretion and without setting a limit on the
number of amendments each party can make.'75 Under pro-
posed Rule 8(A), the court no longer has to struggle with wheth-
er to grant leave to amend, but rather must allow each party to
amend its pleading one time.176 Allowing parties to freely
amend once conforms with the policy embodied in rule 15(a) of
the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure.'77 Because the purpose
of pleadings is to give notice and enable the opponent and the
court to anticipate and meet the issues to be raised at trial,'78
justice of the peace court." Id. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-31-906 (1995).
171. See proposed Rule 7(C)(2).
172. See id.
173. The Rules do not prohibit or provide a penalty for exaggerating a counter-
claim to defeat the plaintiffs justice or city court jurisdiction. Again, a corollary to
Rule 11 of the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure in the proposed Rules might oper-
ate to deter extreme overstatement of the claim.
174. Compare MONT. J. & CITY CT. R. Cirv. P. 8 with MONT. R. CIV. P. 15.
175. See MONT. J. & CITY CT. R. Civ. P. 8.
176. See proposed Rule 8(A).
177. See MONT. R. CIrv. P. 15(a) (allowing a party to amend once as a matter of
course at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one
to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed
upon the trial calendar, at any time). Even when the original amendment time has
passed, the rule specifies that "leave shall be freely given when justice so requires."
Id.
178. See MONT. J. & CITY CT. R. CIv. P. 7(D)(1); proposed Rule 7(F)(1).
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the pleadings must be as accurate as possible. "[P]leadings are
not an end in themselves, but are only a means to the proper
presentation of a case... "179 Allowing each party to amend its
pleading facilitates trial of the actual issues, rather than confin-
ing the trial to what may have been a party's incomplete under-
standing of the issues at the beginning of the action.
On the other hand, allowing parties to file an unrestricted
number of amendments at any time in the litigation might en-
courage parties to file misleading pleadings at the outset, then
amend the pleading close to the time of trial to prejudice his or
her opponent. Proposed Rule 8(A) seeks to prevent this potential
abuse in two ways: (1) allowing each party only one amendment
without leave of court; and (2) requiring that the amendment be
filed "within 10 days after the other party's pleading has been
served."' Because the time between pleading and trial is
shorter in the courts of limited jurisdiction than in the district
courts, the period of time in which a party may amend the com-
plaint without leave of court is correspondingly shorter. 8'
179. Prentice Lumber Co. v. Hukill, 161 Mont. 8, 17, 504 P.2d 277, 282 (1972)
(quoting 3 JAMES W. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 15.02(1), at 813 (1938)).
180. Proposed Rule 8(A). Thus, the plaintiff has the opportunity to react to the
defendant's answer by filing an amended complaint. Proposed Rule 8(B), which is
identical to the current Rules, requires the defendant to file an answer to the
amended complaint within 20 days. See MONT. J. & CITY CT. R. CIrv. P. 8(B); pro-
posed Rule 8(B). However, proposed Rule 8(A) is harder to apply to defendants who
wish to amend their answers. Under current Rule 5(A), a defendant has 20 days in
which to file an answer. See MONT. J. & CITY CT. R. Civ. P. 5(A). If the defendant
waits more than 10 days to file its original answer, however, he or she may not be
able to amend because any amendment would be more than "10 days after the other
party's pleading has been served." Id. This result is contrary to the policy allowing
each party one free amendment. To accomplish the intended result, I suggest that
proposed Rule 8(A) read:
A. WHEN ALLOWED
Each party may amend its pleading one time, without leave of court, if the
amended pleading is filed within the following times:
a. the plaintiffs amended complaint, if any, must be filed either
before or within 10 days after the defendant's answer is served
upon plaintiff.
b. the defendant's amended answer, if any, must be filed within
10 days of the filing of the original answer. The amended answer
may add a counterclaim consistent with Rule 7(C).
181. Compare proposed Rule 8(A) (giving parties 10 days to fie without leave)
with MONT. R. Civ. P. 15(a) (giving parties 20 days to file without leave).
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7. Real Party in Interest: Rule 10
The real-party-in-interest rule is a slightly simpler version of
the district court rule. 8 2 The changes suggested by the 1997
amendment do not affect either the meaning or application of the
rule, but simply make it easier to understand. The drafters stat-
ed the effect of naming a party who is not the real party in inter-
est in the affirmative, rather than the more confusing nega-
tive.'" The proposed Rule states that "the court must require
an amendment of the pleading to name the real party in inter-
est. If the real party in interest is not named within five days,
the action should be dismissed without prejudice."'
While proposed Rule 10(B) states that the court must re-
quire an amendment to name the real party in interest, it does
not indicate how the issue is to be brought to the attention of the
court. Presumably, a party will raise the issue by motion, as in
district court," but proposed Rule 10(B) also leaves room for
sua sponte rulings by the court.'86 The technicality of the real-
party-in-interest requirement and the relative lack of legal expe-
rience of pro se litigants make the proposed Rule more appropri-
ate for the courts of limited jurisdiction.
8. Discovery: Rule 13
Discovery is an area in which civil practice in the courts of
limited jurisdiction differs markedly from the district court pro-
cedure. The most extreme difference is in the most fundamental
concept: in district court, discovery is a matter of right largely
unregulated by -the court; in justice and city courts, discovery is
not allowed without prior permission of the judge and may be
limited in frequency and extent. Many justice and city court
judges report that attorneys who practice only sporadically in
their courts appear unaware of this difference and frequently
propound discovery without seeking the court approval mandat-
ed by the current Rule 13.181 They then compound this error
(and their subsequent humiliation) by moving to compel respons-
es or for sanctions when, in fact, they are the parties in violation
of the Rules.
182. Compare MONT. J. & CITY CT. R. Civ. P. 10 with MONT. R. Civ. P. 17(a).
183. Compare MONT. J. & CITY CT. R. CIv. P. 10(B) with proposed Rule 10(B).
184. Proposed rule 10(B).
185. See MONT. R. Civ. P. 17(a).
186. See proposed Rule 10(B).
187. See MONT. J. & CITY CT. R. Crv. P. 13.
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Proposed Rule 13 clarifies the restrictions on discovery in
the courts of limited jurisdiction, stating unequivocally: "There
shall be no formal discovery except as provided by these
rules."1" Proposed rule 13 also states a new preference for in-
formal discovery, requiring a party moving for formal discovery
first to certify that it tried, but was unsuccessful in obtaining,
informal discovery.189 These provisions reflect a policy to mini-
mize formal discovery and, thus, prevent unlimited discovery and
unnecessary expense and delay. The need to limit discovery
wastes is even greater in a system where the amounts in dispute
are minimal. Further, the subcommittee recognized that allowing
parties to use formal discovery increases the imbalance of power
that occurs where one party is represented while the other is
appearing pro se.
However, even where the amount in dispute is below $5,000,
the complexity of issues and need for information vary tremen-
dously from case to case. Therefore, proposed Rule 3(A), like the
current Rule 3(A), gives the justice and city courts the express
authority to limit the frequency and extent of discovery depend-
ing on the availability of the information by other means and the
"needs of the case, the amount in controversy, limitations on the
party's resources, and the importance of the issues at stake in
the litigation."9 ° While a court still maintains the discretion to
refuse discovery altogether, this discretion should be used spar-
ingly in light of the overall goal of the Rules-to secure an inex-
pensive, speedy and, most importantly, just determination of
every action."9 To assure trial on the merits, rather than trial
by ambush, both parties must know in advance the facts of the
case and the evidence that will be introduced at trial.'
Proposed Rule 13(A) also clarifies which methods of discov-
188. Proposed Rule 13(A).
189. The rule does not define "informal discovery," but the subcommittee consid-
ered all attempts to gather relevant information without using written interrogato-
ries, requests for production, depositions, or subpoena to be informal. Informal discov-
ery also includes simple written or oral requests for information from the other side
or from non-parties.
190. Proposed Rule 13(A)(3)(iii).
191. See MONT. J. & CrrY CT. R. Civ. P. 1.
192. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). In that case, the supreme
court stated that the new rules of discovery allow "the parties to obtain the fullest
possible knowledge of the issues and facts before trial . . . . No longer can the time-
honored cry of "fishing expedition" serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the
facts underlying his opponent's case. Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts
gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation." Id. at 501.
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ery a limited jurisdiction judge may allow.193 The term "mo-
tions to produce" has been changed to "requests for production"
to parallel the language of the Montana Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. "'94 More importantly, the proposed rule elucidates deposi-
tion practice in Montana's limited jurisdiction courts. Under the
current Rule 13(A), parties may use motions to produce and
written interrogatories with prior authorization from the
court.195 However, current Rule 13(B), governing depositions,
contains no such requirement. 9 ' This format may give rise to
an argument that no prior court permission is necessary for a
deposition. Proposed Rule 13 clarifies that, as with requests for
production and interrogatories, a party may only arrange a depo-
sition with prior permission from the judge.'97 If a deposition is
allowed, the procedure is the same as in district court. 98
The subcommittee also added Rule 13(B), which provides for
the award of sanctions, including attorneys' fees, for failure to
comply with either a discovery order' or Rule 13(A)."° Thus,
the proposed Rules contain a sanction provision for discovery
violations, but not for pleadings.2 ' There is a reason for this
apparent discrepancy. The purpose of pleadings is to give notice
to each side and to the court of the general nature of the dispute
to be resolved at trial. Pleadings are not meant to be unduly
technical or difficult for the parties to compose. On the other
hand, when the court has already found that the court-ordered
discovery is necessary to accomplish the goal of fair trial on the
merits, any attempt to subvert the process will cause expense,
time, and prejudice to the opposing party. The potential for sanc-
tions should discourage those parties tempted to delay or derail
their opponents' pretrial preparation.
193. See proposed Rule 13(A)(1).
194. See MONT. R. Civ. P. 34.
195. See MONT. J. & CITY CT. R. Civ. P. 13(A)(1).
196. See MONT. J. & CITY CT. R. Crv. P. 13(B).
197. See proposed Rule 13(A)(5).
198. See id.; see also MONT. R. CIv. P. 26, 28-30 (outlining deposition procedure).
199. The Justice and City Court Rules do not lay out a specific procedure for
obtaining and enforcing discovery orders, unlike Rule 37 of the Montana Rules of
Civil Procedure. See MONT. R. CIv. P. 37(b). This is, in part, because the justice and
city courts assess the proposed discovery beforehand.
200. See proposed Rule 13(B) (giving the court discretion to award, against the
failing party, reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, caused by the failure to
comply).
201. See supra section lV(B)(4).
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9. Pretrial Conferences: Rule 14
Pretrial conferences in the courts of limited jurisdiction are
governed by current Rule 14 and Rule 16 of the Uniform Justice
and City Court Rules. 2 Under these rules, at the request of a
party, the court may but is not required to order one or more
pretrial conferences.0 3 The current Rule 14(A) lists five objec-
tives of a pretrial conference, but gives no specific guidance to
judges as to how they can accomplish these objectives. 2" This
omission is particularly troublesome in a system where many
judges' first exposure to the litigation process comes after they
are elected or appointed to the bench. Many of the judges are
unsure how to conduct a pretrial conference and, thus, are reluc-
tant to hold them."5 The subcommittee believes that pretrial
conferences are useful both in settling cases and expediting the
trial of those cases that are not settled and should be encour-
aged.2" Thus, proposed Rule 14 lists possible subjects to dis-
cuss to provide limited jurisdiction judges with a checklist ap-
proach to pretrial conferences.0"
In addition, the proposed Rule 14(B) specifies the responsi-
bilities of each party attending a pretrial conference.2 8 As in
district court, one representative for each party must have au-
thority to enter into stipulations and make admissions so that
the proceedings run as smoothly and effectively as possible.2"
The subcommittee believed it was especially important to alert
pro se litigants to the fact that significant changes in the posture
of the case may occur at the pretrial conference and to encourage
202. See MONT. J. & CITY CT. R. Crv. P. 14; MONT. UNIF. R. J. & CITY CT. 16.
203. Cf MONT. UNIF. DIST. CT. R. 5 (requiring a pretrial conference in all con-
tested district court civil cases unless otherwise ordered by the court).
204. See MONT. J. & CITY CT. R. Civ. P. 14(A); see also MONT. R. Crv. P. 16(A)
(listing identical objectives).
205. Interview with participating judges, Montana Justice Institute, at the Uni-
versity of Montana School of Law, Missoula, Mont. (Summer, 1994). In the civil pro-
cedure course I taught at the Montana Justice Institute, a few judges from counties
with larger civil caseloads indicated that they used pretrial conferences regularly, but
a majority of the judges indicated that they were hesitant to schedule them. Id.
206. Under proposed Rule 14(A), pretrial conferences are still not mandatory, but
the subcommittee believed explaining their purposes and procedure would encourage
judges to use them.
207. See proposed Rule 14(A). Judges are free to add or delete particular items;
the list of subjects is permissive rather than mandatory. See id.
208. See proposed Rule 17(B). This rule states "at least one of the attorneys for
each party." Id. I believe this should be further amended to read "each party, or at
least one representative for each party," to recognize the large number of pro se
litigants in these courts.
209. See proposed Rule 14(B)(9).
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them to think about the subjects listed in Rule 14(B) prior to the
actual conference.
10. Right to Jury: Rule 15
Obviously, both the United States Constitution and the
Montana Constitution bind the courts of limited jurisdiction;
therefore, these courts must preserve a party's right to trial by
jury.21° The current Rule 15 refers only to the Montana Consti-
tution and statutes.2 1' The subcommittee decided to specify, for
the ease of its readers, that the Constitution of the United States
is one of the sources of this jury right.212 Another notable fea-
ture of Rule 15, which is not affected by the 1997 proposed
amendments, but is different from district court practice, is that
the deadline for filing a demand for a jury trial is five days after
the last pleading directed to the issue, rather than the ten days
allowed by the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure.213
11. Judgments: Rule 21
a. Dismissal without Prejudice for Improper Venue
The current Rule 21(A) allows a defendant to obtain a dis-
missal by raising an objection of improper venue at trial. '14 In
order to prevent the waste of the parties' and courts' resources,
the proposed Rule requires a defendant who believes that venue
is improper to move for dismissal at least ten days prior to tri-
al.2"' The proposed Rule should also be amended to conform to
the new version of Rule 3, governing venue.1 6
b. Judgment on the Pleadings
Currently, judgment on the pleadings is allowed in the
courts of limited jurisdiction,1 7 but proposed Rule 21 adds an
210. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 26.
211. See MONT. J. & CITY CT. R. Civ. P. 15.
212. See proposed Rule 15(A).
213. Compare MONT. J. & CITY CT. R. Civ. P. 15(B) and proposed Rule 15(B)
with MONT. R. Civ. PROC. 38(b).
214. See MONT. J. & CITY CT. R. Civ. P. 21(A)(2)(c).
215. See proposed Rule 21(A)(2)(c).
216. The Rules currently before the supreme court do not conform with the pro-
posed venue rule and should be amended before the Court publishes the rules for
comment to inform litigants of the venue rule.
217. See MONT. J. & CITY CT. R. Civ. P. 21(A)(4).
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express standard for judges to apply when assessing whether to
grant motions for judgment on the pleadings. '18 Motions for
judgment on the pleadings are fairly technical, and most judges
do not hear them frequently. The subcommittee thought it would
be more efficient to condense the common law standard into the
rule than to require a judge with limited resources (and often no
law library) to look to the case law for guidance. Clear expres-
sion of the standard should also help litigants decide whether to
move for judgment on the pleadings.
c. Summary Judgment
While the subcommittee attempted to address all of the
problems with Rule 21, judgments, one necessary addition does
not appear in the 1997 amendments. The rule does not contain a
specific statement granting the courts of limited jurisdiction the
power to order summary judgment."9 The current Rule 21 im-
plies that limited jurisdiction courts can grant summary judg-
ment by stating that "if, on a motion for judgment on the
pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are presented to and
not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for
summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, Mon-
tana Rules of Civil Procedure ....
During the drafting of the proposed Rules, the subcommittee
was divided on the issue of whether to allow limited jurisdiction
courts to grant summary judgments. I argued that the implicit
power should be made explicit and that the Rules should specifi-
cally authorize summary judgment. In November 1996, the sub-
committee discussed this issue with the justices of the Montana
Supreme Court and ultimately decided to remove all summary
judgment language and practice from the Rules. 221 Summary
judgment should be available in justice and city courts, as in
district courts, to prevent the courts and parties from going to
trials when it becomes clear that there are no material issues of
fact to be resolved. Particularly in light of the increasing case-
load of the limited jurisdiction courts, judges should be familiar
218. See proposed Rule 21(A)(4) (stating that "the Court may only grant
judgment on the pleadings if the pleadings themselves show that it would be impos-
sible for the party against whom the judgment is entered to prevail at trial").
219. See proposed Rule 21(A)(5) (stating that summary judgment is not allowed).
220. MONT. J. & CITY CT. R. Civ. P. 21(A)(4).
221. See proposed Rule 21(A)(5). I still respectfully disagree and urge those
readers who will be affected to comment specifically to the Montana Supreme Court
on this proposed change.
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with and use both summary judgment and judgment on the
pleadings. 2
I recommend that Rule 21 contain a subsection similar to
the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for judg-
ment by confession." 3 The Rule would then read: "Either party
may move for, and the judge may grant, summary judgment on
one or more of the issues raised by the pleadings. In so moving,
and responding to the motion, and in ruling on the motion, the
parties and the court shall follow the procedures specified in
Rule 56, Montana Rules of Civil Procedure .... 224
d. Default Judgment
Under the current Rules, the plaintiff is neither required nor
allowed to file a reply to a counterclaim, and cross-claims are not
allowed. 2 ' Thus, the only pleading that the defendant must file
is an answer. Furthermore, the Rules do not provide for any pre-
answer motions. 22' The defendant must plead all defenses in
the answer and must answer within twenty days of being served
to avoid default. 7
In contrast, in district court, attorneys routinely file "empty"
Rule 12(b)(6) motions without any supporting affidavits or briefs
in an attempt to gain more time to investigate and file a sub-
stantive answer.228 Many attorneys who do not practice regu-
222. One segment of the Montana Justice Institute instructed the judges on the
role and purpose of summary judgment, presented several Montana and U.S. Su-
preme Court cases on the subject, and required the judges to rule on a mock oral
argument and prepare written findings of fact and conclusions of law. The judges at
the Institute performed well on this exercise, grasping both the law of summary
judgment and the application of that law to the facts of the case.
223. See MONT. R. CIV. P. 57 (stating, "judgment by confession must be as pro-
vided for in Title 27, Chapter 9 of the Montana Code Annotated").
224. If the Rules are amended to allow summary judgment, proposed Rule
21(A)(4) should be amended to reinstate its reference to matters outside the
pleadings and the consequent conversion of the judgment on the pleadings to a sum-
mary judgment.
225. See MONT. J. & CITY CT. R. Civ. P. 7; but see proposed Rule 7(C) (provid-
ing for a reply to a counterclaim).
226. Cf MONT. R. Civ. P. 12(b).
227. See proposed Rule 5(A).
228. See MONT. R. CIv. P. 12(b)(6). This practice appears to be unique to Mon-
tana and may be risky to the defendant who fails to consider and include other,
more meritorious Rule 12 defenses then open to him or her. See MONT. R. CIV. P.
12(h). It, is, however, well-recognized and accepted in the district courts. See, e.g.,
Ass'n of Unit Owners v. Big Sky, Inc., 224 Mont. 142, 729 P.2d 469 (1986). The
Advisory Committee's note to the October 9, 1994 amendment of Rule 11 of the
Montana Rules of Civil Procedure specifically acknowledges this practice and states:
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larly in the courts of limited jurisdiction are not aware that mak-
ing dilatory motion to dismiss is not an accepted practice in
these courts. The current Rule 21 authorizes the entry of default
and judgment when the defendant has failed to plead or other-
wise defend. 29 The similarity between this rule and Rule 55 of
the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure may lead litigants to be-
lieve that the Rules allow a defendant to defend other than by
the answer when, in fact, they do not.23°
Thus, a misled or uninformed attorney who files an empty
12(b)(6) motion in a limited jurisdiction court, which is custom-
ary in district court, may expect at least a notice before a default
judgment is entered. 2 '1 The amendment deletes the misleading
language and states that when a party has failed to answer, the
judge or clerk must enter the default.232 Hopefully, this simple
change will make it clearer to those appearing in the courts of
limited jurisdiction sporadically or for the first time that they
must file a formal answer or risk default.
Rule 21 also clarifies the existing two-step process for ob-
taining a default judgment: first, the clerk may enter a default
without any judicial involvement; and, second, the court enters a
judgment based on that default. 23 As in district court, the
clerk may enter judgment, but only if the claim is for a sum
certain. 2' The judge must enter judgment in all other cas-
es. 235 proposed Rule 21 should be further amended to give more
explicit guidance to limited jurisdiction judges regarding the
extent of their powers when faced with a request for default
judgment, particularly from a represented party who is opposing
a pro se defendant.
"It is not the intent of the Advisory Committee . . . to do away with this practice."
229. See MONT. J. & CITY CT. R. CIV. P. 21(A)(7).
230. See MONT. R. Civ. P. 55(a). The subcommittee decided that allowing these
motions before answer would unnecessarily confuse and delay the proceedings. Be-
cause the amounts at stake are limited and the time to trial is shorter than in dis-
trict court, the defenses raised in the answer can be addressed at trial.
231. See MONT. R. CIv. P. 55(b)(2).
232. See proposed Rule 21(A)(8)(a)(1).
233. See proposed Rule 21(A)(8)(a)(1),(2). When I discussed this subject with the
judges present at the Montana Justice Institute and annual training sessions, most
did not understand that a default and a judgment based on that default were very
different.
234. See proposed Rule 21(A).
235. See proposed Rule 21(A)(8)(b).
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12. Execution of Judgments
Proposed Rule 23, which governs the execution of judgments,
changes the territorial limit for execution from "within the coun-
ty or city" to "within the boundaries of the state" to conform with
the change to statewide personal jurisdiction proposed in Rule
4.236 Thus, a justice or city court judge who enters judgment
may issue a writ of execution directly to any county in the
state.27 The second change to Rule 23 conforms to existing
practice and is intended to simplify the execution process. Under
the proposed Rule, the writ remains in effect for sixty days from
the time it is issued and may be served multiple times during
that period. 2' The writ must be returned to the court at the
end of the sixty-day period or when the judgment is satisfied,
whichever occurs earlier. 39
V. RECOMMENDED LEGISLATIVE CHANGES
The review and revision of the current civil procedure rules
for justice and city courts has also revealed the need for some
legislative changes. If the Supreme Court adopts the proposed
amendments to the Rules, these statutory amendments would
meld the amended rules and statutory procedure provisions
together in a way that judges and litigants can easily under-
stand and apply.
A. City Courts
In addition to the Rules and the Uniform Rules for the Jus-
tice and City Courts, statutory provisions have governed civil
procedure in the courts of limited jurisdiction. The 1991 Montana
Legislature repealed many of the statutes that were inconsistent
236. See proposed Rules 23(D).
237. See proposed Rule 23(A)(1). The current rule provides that the clerk of the
justice court in which the judgment was entered may issue execution in any county
in the state. The proposed change to Rule 23(A)(1) creates consistency in the two
subsections. Cf MONT. J. & CITY CT. R. CIrv. P. 23(A) (1), (2).
238. See proposed Rule 23(B).
239. See proposed Rule 23(D). Currently, the courts are split on whether a single
writ may be served more than once; several courts allow this practice, while the
stricter view is that a served writ must be returned and a new one issued. Where
the amount collected is only part of the judgment amount, this traditional approach
wastes time and resources. Thus, proposed Rule 23(D) specifically allows the writ of
execution to be served multiple times. See proposed Rule 23(D). Court supervision of
the collection process occurs every 60 days when the writ must be returned even if
the judgment is unsatisfied. See id.
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with or redundant to the current Rules, including all of Title 25,
Chapter 32, entitled "Procedure in City Courts," and most of
Title 25, Chapter 33, entitled "Procedure in Justices' Courts."2"
Several procedural provisions remain which appear to apply to
justice court, but not city court, proceedings, resulting in a dis-
crepancy between the courts that should be corrected.241 The
statutory provisions on civil procedure in justice courts that sur-
vived the 1991 repeal effort should be renamed "Procedure in
Justice and City Courts," and specific provisions which refer to
the "justice" should add the phrase "or judge."
B. Personal Jurisdiction
As discussed above, the proposed Rules state that justice
and city court jurisdiction is statewide, and, thus, the statutes
governing personal jurisdiction should clearly state this as
well.24 2 Section 3-10-304 of the Montana Code should be
amended to state that the civil jurisdiction of both city and jus-
tice courts extends throughout the state of Montana. The lan-
guage of the statute should also clearly allow a limited jurisdic-
tion court to issue a summons and a writ of execution to be
served anywhere in the state. Section 25-31-914 of the Montana
Code already provides that a judgment of a justice court creates
a lien in any county in which it is filed with the district court,
but should be amended to specify that the same statewide en-
forcement applies to city court judgments.24
C. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The Montana Code should also be amended to clarify the
difference between praying for damages that exceed the limited
jurisdiction court's jurisdictional amount and receiving a judg-
ment that exceeds the court's jurisdictional amount.24 Under
240. Act of Feb. 7. 1991, ch. 16, § 63, 1991 MONT. LAws 34, 88.
241. For example, prior to its repeal, section 25-32-101 of the Montana Code
provided: "All proceedings in civil actions in city courts must . . . be conducted in
the same manner as civil actions in justices' courts and conform to the Montana Jus-
tice Courts Rules of Civil Procedure." MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-32-101 (1989) (repealed
1991).
242. See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
243. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-31-914 (1995). The current rules allow statewide
issuance of a writ of execution. See MONT. J. & CITY CT. R. Civ. P. 23(AX2).
244. Thus, section 25-31-906 of the Montana Code should be amended to read,
"in cases where a party's demand for judgment is less than the sum for which the
justice is authorized to enter judgment, but the amount found due to that party
1997] 245
49
Ford: Civil Practice in Montana's "People's Courts"
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1997
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
the reasoning of Reynolds v. Smith,2" a party who files an ac-
tion in justice or city court, which contains a demand within the
court's jurisdictional amount, may prosecute that action, even if
the party could have demanded more. Furthermore, a party may
receive an award for more than the court's monetary limit with-
out depriving the court of subject matter jurisdiction. In that
instance, section 25-31-906 of the Montana Code offers the plain-
tiff, or counterclaimant, two choices: (1) to accept a judgment
from the justice court for the jurisdictional amount and waive
any claim to the excess; or (2) to refile the entire action in dis-
trict court and have a new trial.2" However, if either the plain-
tiff or the counterclaimant demands more than the jurisdictional
limit in the pleading, the court does not have subject matter
jurisdiction and must dismiss the claim without prejudice.247
D. Representation
To clarify the status of non-lawyer and lawyer representa-
tives in the courts of limited jurisdiction, the legislature should
amend section 25-31-601 of the Montana Code. That statute
currently states that "... any person, except the constable by
whom the summons or jury process was served, may act as attor-
ney" in justice court.24 This statute should include the restric-
tions placed on non-attorney representation in Sparks v. John-
son:249 only non-recurring representation by non-lawyer friends
and relatives of parties is allowed, and recurring representation
by non-lawyers, particularly for profit, is not allowed. Further,
the legislature should amend sections 37-61-201 and -210 of the
Montana Code to list activities that constitute "practicing law,"
which conform with the activities set out in Merchants' Credit
Service25° and Sparks,251 and provide for a penalty for prac-
ticing without a license.
exceeds that sum, such party may remit the excess and judgment may be entered for
the residue." Cf MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-31-906 (1995).
245. 48 Mont. 149, 135 P. 1190 (1913).
246. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-31-906 (1995).
247. See proposed Rule 7(C) (clarifying that when a party's demand for judgment
exceeds the monetary limit, the case should be dismissed without prejudice). See
supra notes 161-73 and accompanying text.
248. MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-31-601 (1995).
249. 252 Mont. 39, 826 P.2d 928 (1992).
250. 104 Mont. 76, 66 P.2d 337 (1937).
251. 252 Mont. at 39. 826 P.2d at 928.
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E. Venue
After adopting the current Rules, the Montana Legislature
repealed all but one of the statutory provisions dealing with
venue and change of venue in justice court to eliminate duplica-
tion, as the language of the rule and statute are identical. How-
ever, one statute, entitled "Actions for Forcible Entry or Unlaw-
ful Detainer," was not repealed.2 In view of the recommended
change to Rule 3(A), allowing the plaintiff to file either in the
location of the property in dispute or in the defendant's county of
residence, the statute is inconsistent, as well as redundant. 253
To eliminate these problems, the 1997 Montana Legislature
should simply repeal section 25-31-205.
VI. CONCLUSION
Montana's courts of limited jurisdiction dispense more civil
justice than any other court system in the state, relying on the
least formal legal education. These courts, and the judges and
parties who operate therein, need Rules which are easy and
logical to understand and apply. The drafters of the current
Rules took an admirable step toward meeting these goals, but
the Rules still need improvement. With a little fine-tuning and a
few major adjustments, the Montana City and Justice Court
Rules of Civil Procedure can fulfill their original purpose: the
beam will glow brighter, and the fog will recede. Similar small
but important changes in some of the relevant statutes will allow
the Rules and the statutes to work together, prevent confusion,
and lessen the need to appeal to the supreme court to resolve
apparent discrepancies. Procedure will be easier, less expensive,
and more understandable to the large number of Montanans who
rely on the people's courts for both the reality and perception of
justice.
252. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-31-205 (1995).
253. Compare MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-31-205 (1995) with proposed Rule
3(A)(1)(e).
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